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Abstract
Local Differential Privacy (LDP) protocols allow an aggregator to obtain population statistics about
sensitive data of a userbase, while protecting the privacy of the individual users. To understand
the tradeoff between aggregator utility and user privacy, we introduce new information-theoretic
metrics for utility and privacy. Contrary to other LDP metrics, these metrics highlight the fact that
the users and the aggregator are interested in fundamentally different domains of information. We
show how our metrics relate to ε-LDP, the de facto standard privacy metric, giving an information-
theoretic interpretation to the latter. Furthermore, we use our metrics to quantitatively study the
privacy-utility tradeoff for a number of popular protocols.
key words: local differential privacy, privacy metrics, utility metrics, information theory,
privacy-utility tradeoff
1 Introduction
1.1 Privacy and utility metrics in Local Differential Privacy
In a context where a data aggregator collects potentially sensitive data, there is an inherent tension
between the aggregator’s desire to obtain accurate population statistics and the individuals’ desire
to protect their private data. One approach to protect privacy is offered by Local Differential
Privacy (LDP) protocols [33]. In this approach, each user randomises his private data before
sending it to the aggregator. This hides the users’ true data, while for a large population size the
randomness of the users cancels out, which allows the aggregator to obtain an accurate estimate
of the population statistics. LDP-mechanisms are widely used in industry by companies such as
Apple [5], Google [23], and Microsoft [16].
One of the main settings in which LDP protocols are used is that of frequency estimation
[57, 23, 55]. In this setting, every user has a private data item from a (finite) set A, and the
aggregator’s goal is to determine the frequencies of the elements of A among the user population.
In this paper, we focus on this setting, as it is both well studied in the literature and frequently
applied in practice.
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The tradeoff between privacy and utility also manifests itself in the context of LDP. Intuitively,
the more ‘random’ the privacy protocol is, the better it will hide an individual’s private data, but
the more noisy the aggregator’s estimations will be. In order to characterise this tradeoff, there is a
need for metrics that measure the privacy and utility of a given protocol. Using these metrics, one
can define a minimal level of privacy that a protocol has to provide, and maximise utility given this
restriction.
The de facto standard metric for the privacy of an LDP protocol is ε-LDP [33], which is an
adaptation of ε-differential privacy, a metric used in the context where the aggregator is trusted
and releases randomised versions of (queries on) a hidden database. Informally, a low value of ε
means that the probability distribution of the output of the protocol does not depend too much on
the input. In this way, the aggregator cannot determine the user’s hidden data from their public
output.
ε-LDP gives an upper bound on privacy leakage in a worst-case sense. The strength of this
approach is that it gives strong privacy guarantees that hold in any situation. However, in practice
it can be difficult to fulfill such a stringent definition of privacy [35, 26, 25], and for this reason
many relaxations of ε-(L)DP have been introduced [22, 14, 20, 42]. Also, the worst-case privacy
leakage can in practice be quite far from the typical leakage of the average user. Therefore, it is
important to study the privacy of protocols not only in terms of its worst-case guarantees, but also
in terms of its typical privacy behaviour.
A natural ‘language’ for studying the behaviour of privacy protocols is information theory, and
several information-theoretic privacy (or leakage) metrics have been proposed, both in the central
and local settings of differential privacy [40, 6, 3, 41, 10, 18, 14, 56]. Many of these define leakage
in terms of the mutual information between a user’s data, and the obfuscated output they send
to the aggregator. However, the aggregator already gains information about a user’s data via the
population statistics inferred from other users’ data; hence the mutual information between input
and output does not accurately represent the information leaked by the protocol if one does not
condition for the population statistics [37, 14].
On the side of utility, the typical way of measuring the performance of a protocol is to give a
frequency oracle, i.e. an algorithm that, given the noisy data from the user population, estimates
the frequencies of the data items, and then measure the average error of this estimation [55, 9].
This method has the downside that even for relatively simple protocols, one has many different
frequency oracles, and it is not a priori clear which one one should adopt [54]. As such, this
approach does not measure the utility of the protocol itself, but of the combination of protocol and
frequency oracle. Furthermore, the average error will depend on the input distribution, and is hard
to study theoretically [9]. This makes it hard to determine optimal protocols if information such as
the number of users, or characteristics of the input distribution, are unknown a priori.
There have been multiple approaches towards defining an information-theoretic utility measure
in the LDP setting [32, 18]. Some of these take the mutual information between input and output
as a utility measure [32, 54], as others would define leakage (see above). However, the aggregator
is interested only in the statistics of the overall population, rather than each user’s individual value
[37]. As such, incorporating all information the aggregator receives into the utility metric leads to
an overstatement of the aggregator’s means to find the relevant information.
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1.2 Contributions and outline
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of new information-theoretic metrics for
privacy and utility in the context of LDP protocols. Let A be a finite set, of which every user
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} has an element Xi ∈ A as its private data; we write ~X := (X1, · · · , Xn). We
model the Xi as being drawn independently according to an unknown probability distribution
P = (Px)x∈A onA. The goal of the aggregator is either to learn P or the tally vector T = (Tx)x∈A,
where Tx = #{i : Xi = x}. Since P is unknown to the aggregator, we model it as being itself a
random variable, with prior distribution µ which reflects the aggregator’s prior knowledge.
Although the total information contained in the users’ data is H( ~X), we will argue that the
part relevant to the aggregator is only I( ~X ;P ) or H(T ). At the same time, we will argue that
the privacy-sensitive information is only H( ~X|P ). To protect his private data, user i computes an
obfuscated data item Yi = Q(Xi), obtained via a (typically nondeterministic) function Q : A → B
for a second finite set B, and sends Yi to the aggregator; the aggregator only has the noisy data
vector ~Y at his disposal. This leads to the following definitions of distribution utility, tally utility
and average privacy (Defs. 4.1 and 4.3):
Udistrn,µ (Q) =
I(~Y ;P )
I( ~X ;P )
, Utallyn,µ (Q) =
I(~Y ;T )
H(T )
, Sµ(Q) =
H( ~X|~Y , P )
H( ~X|P )
. (1.1)
Note that the dependence on µ is implicit, as it is the distribution of the random variable P . Putting
these equations into words, utility is the fraction of relevant information that the aggregator has ac-
cess to, while privacy is the fraction of sensitive information that is withheld from the aggregator.
We will argue that these metrics have several advantages over existing metrics: they offer an intu-
itive meaning of privacy and utility, they are applicable to a wide range of privacy protocols, and
they take into account the fact that utility deals with a domain of information that is fundamentally
different from the domain of information that is covered by privacy.
We discuss the mathematical properties of these new metrics. There are four main results:
• Worst case privacy (Section 5): We introduce a natural worst-case counterpart to Sµ, and we
show that it is equivalent to ε-LDP (Theorem 5.3). This shows that ε-LDP has a natural information-
theoretic interpretation.
• Limit behaviour (Section 6): We study the limit behaviour of the metrics Udistrn,µ and U
tally
n,µ . This
limit behaviour can be expressed in terms of an asymptotic utility Uasµ , yielding a utility metric
only dependent on Q and µ. We give an explicit formula to calculate Uasµ .
• Combining protocols (Section 7): We discuss the behaviour of privacy and utility metrics un-
der three commonly used methods of protocol combination: sequential, parallel and mixture. In
particular, we show that the concept of a ‘privacy budget’ [21] also applies to Sµ.
• Privacy-versus-utility tradeoff (Section 8): We derive an upper bound on the asymptotic utility
in terms of the worst-case privacy. This bound does not depend on the prior distribution µ.
Furthermore we study two additional aspects of the metrics:
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• In section 9 we discuss the relation of the new utility metric with the posterior distribution of P ,
and how the aggregator can compute the posterior.
• In section 10 we apply the new metrics to two established protocols, Generalised Randomised
Response [57] and Unary Encoding [55]. Although the new metrics can be computationally ex-
pensive, we show that in concrete cases the computational complexity can be significantly reduced
as compared to the general case.
For readability, we present the proofs of all mathematical statements in the appendices.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Where possible, random variables are denoted with capitals, their realisations with lowercase let-
ters, and sets with calligraphic capitals. The identity operation onA is written as idA. IfA is finite,
then we denote the set of all probability distributions on A by PA; for A = {1, . . . , a} the set PA
consists of all p = (p1, · · · , pa) ∈ Ra such that px ≥ 0 for all x and
∑a
x=1 px = 1. Expectation
over a random variable X is written as EX . Throughout we use ‘log’ to denote the natural loga-
rithm, and we use the natural logarithm as the basis for our information-theoretic definitions (see
section 2.3). Taking another base does not change anything substantial. We write δ(·) for the Dirac
delta function.
2.2 Privacy protocols
Let A be a finite set. A privacy protocol for A is a pair Q = (Q˜,B) where B is a finite set, and
Q˜ = (Q˜y|x)y∈B,x∈A ∈ R
B×A
≥0 is a collection of nonnegative reals such that
∑
y Q˜y|x = 1 for all x.
We will often identify A = {1, · · · , a} and B = {1, · · · , b}, and consider Q˜ as a (b × a)-matrix.
We can considerQ as a random function: for x ∈ A, we let Q(x) ∈ B be the random variable with
probability distribution Q˜•|x. Furthermore, we let Q∗ : PA → PB be the map that sends p to Q˜ · p,
where · denotes matrix-vector multiplication. Note that ifX ∼ p, then Q(X) ∼ Q∗p.
2.3 Information-theoretic concepts
Let X ∈ A be a discrete random variable. The Shannon entropy of X is defined as H(X) =∑
x∈A px log
1
px
;1 this measures the uncertainty aboutX . If Y ∈ B is another random variable, then
the conditional entropy of X given Y is defined as H(X|Y ) = Ey[H(X|Y = y)]; this measures
the uncertainty about X , provided that one knows Y . Note that Y does not need to be discrete.
The complement of conditional entropy is the mutual information I(X ; Y ) := H(X) − H(X|Y ),
which is the amount of information learned from X by knowing Y , or vice versa (see below). One
can write this as I(X ; Y ) = Ex,y log
px|Y=y
px
, and the result will always be nonnegative.
1With the understanding that 0 · log 1
0
= 0.
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Let P be a smooth random variable on A, i.e. it has a smooth probability density function
f : PA → R≥0. Then the differential entropy of P is defined as
h(P ) =
∫
p∈[0,1]a
δ
(∑
x
px − 1
)
f(p) log
1
f(p)
dp. (2.1)
If p ∈ [0, 1], we let Hb(p) be the entropy of a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p, i.e.
Hb(p) = −p log p− (1− p) log(1− p). For more background on information-theoretic definitions
we refer to [13, 15].
2.4 The LDP setting
We consider the setting of Local Differential Privacy. There are n users, and user i has a private
data item Xi ∈ A. The aggregator publishes a privacy protocol Q = (Q˜,B). User i calculates
Yi := Q(Xi) and sends Yi to the aggregator. We write ~Y = (Yi)ni=1; this is the data the aggregator
has at their disposal. Note that the LDP setting differs from DP in that the users do not give the
aggregator their bare private data.
In order to apply information theory, we describe everything in a probabilistic way. We consider
X1, · · · , Xn to be drawn independently from a probability distribution p ∈ PA. The probability
distribution p is unknown to the aggregator as well: hence we consider it to be a random variable
P . The distribution of P is given by a probability measure µ on PA (with respect to the Borel σ-
algebra [27] on PA); this distribution reflects the prior knowledge of the aggregator. The extended
model is depicted in Fig. 1. We consider µ with the following two properties:
µ({p ∈ PA : ∃x s.t. px = 1}) < 1, (2.2)
#supp(µ) > 1. (2.3)
If (2.2) does not hold, then we are in the degenerate situation that the aggregator has prior knowl-
edge that all users have the same value. In such a situation, there is no concept of privacy. If (2.3)
does not hold, then a priori there is only one possible value for P . In such a situation, there is no
concept of utility.
We consider two possible objectives of the aggregator:
1. The aggregator wants to know P as accurately as possible. For instance, the aggregator is a
scientist whose userbase is a sample of a greater population. The aggregator is not concerned with
this specific userbase per se, but rather with the characteristics of the general population.
2. For ~x ∈ An and γ ∈ A, let tγ(~x) = #{i : xi = γ} and t(~x) = (tγ(~x))γ∈A. Then the aggregator
wants to know the tallies T := t( ~X) as accurately as possible. For instance, the users are customers
of a service, and the service provider wants to know statistics about this specific group.
We will see later that although these two goals are not directly interchangeable, these goals will
overlap more as the number of users grows to infinity. For both of these goals, it suffices for the
aggregator to consider Sy := #{i : Yi = y}, for y ∈ B.
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Figure 1: Extended model of the LDP setting, including the stochastic P .
2.5 Dirichlet distributions
An important characteristic of the setting is the prior distribution µ. A typical choice for the prior
distribution is the Dirichlet distribution. For a vector α ∈ Ra≥0, the Dirichlet distribution with
parameter α is the continuous probability distribution on PA whose probability density function
∆α is given by ∆α(p) = B(α)−1
∏a
x=1 p
αx−1
x . Here B is the multivariate beta function, i.e.
B(α1, · · · , αa) =
∏a
x=1 Γ(αx)
Γ (
∑a
x=1 αx)
. (2.4)
In the situation where the aggregator does not have any prior information, a reasonable choice for
the prior distribution µ is the Jeffreys prior. Its key characteristic is that it is an uninformative
prior, i.e. its formulation does not depend on the parametrisation of the parameter space. In our
situation, where the parameter space is PA, the Jeffreys prior equals the Dirichlet distribution with
parameter vector (1
2
, · · · , 1
2
).
3 Existing metrics
3.1 Current non-information-theoretic metrics
3.1.1 Privacy
The de facto standard for assessing the level of privacy of a protocol is Local Differential Privacy.
It was introduced to be the ‘local’ counterpart to DP [21].
Definition 3.1. Let Q be a privacy protocol for A. Then the local differential privacy level [33] of
Q is defined as
LDP(Q) := max
x,x′∈A
max
y∈B
log
Q˜y|x
Q˜y|x′
. (3.1)
Let ε ∈ R≥0. We say that Q satisfies ε-LDP if LDP(Q) ≤ ε.
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A lower LDP level ensures higher privacy, as the probability distributions Q˜•|x and Q˜•|x′ do
not differ too much; this makes it hard for the aggregator to determine Xi given Q(Xi). While
the notion of ε-LDP gives strong privacy guarantees, even in worst-case settings, it has several
drawbacks. First, it has been noted that DP, the counterpart of LDP in the centralised setting,
is too strict for many applications, because it puts a strong requirement on the relative values of
output probabilities, even for those y which occur with only a very low probability. As such many
relaxations for DP exist [22, 14, 14, 20, 42]. Second, ε-LDP is defined only for probabilistic
protocols; in particular, deterministic protocols do not offer privacy according to the LDP metric
(see Example 3.2). Deterministic protocols are used, however, in the context of, for example k-
anonimity [46]. Although it is generally felt that such protocols are not very good, it would be nice
to have a metric that is able to measure their quality.
Example 3.2. Suppose A = {1, · · · , 2k} for an integer k, and Q is the deterministic privacy
protocol given by Q(x) = x mod 2. Then LDP(Q) = ∞, because Q˜1|1 = 1 whereas Q˜1|0 = 0;
hence in the LDP-metricQ does not offer any privacy. On the other hand, intuitively it is clear that
Q protects at least some of the user’s private information.
3.1.2 Utility
The main way of measuring the utility of a protocol is by looking at frequency estimators, and how
well they estimate the original input frequencies.
Definition 3.3. Let ϕ ∈ RA be the real (hidden) vector of the frequencies of the different data
items among the user population, and let ϕˆ : Yn → RA be a function that computes an estimator
of ϕ from ~Y . Let d : RA → R≥0 be a metric on RA. Then the d-accuracy of (Q, ϕˆ) for n users
given ϕ is defined as
Accd,n,ϕ(Q, ϕˆ) = E
[
d(ϕ, ϕˆ(~Y ))
]
. (3.2)
Typically one chooses the ℓ1- or ℓ2-norm for d. The metric depends on d, n, and ϕ, but this does
not matter too much: we can get rid of the dependence on ϕ by taking either the expected value over
the prior distribution or the worst case [9], and the choice of d can be tailored to the aggregator’s
demands. As to the dependence on n, for d = ℓ1, ℓ2 it can be shown that the accuracy can be
expressed as c · n−1/2 [19, 18, 55], hence maximising the accuracy comes down to maximising the
constant c. Nevertheless, there are several issues with this approach. First, the metric measures
the utility of the pair (Q, ϕˆ), rather than just the utility of Q. This is an issue because in general
there are many different choices for ϕˆ, without a clear a priori reason to prefer any one of them
[54]. Second, while for explicit linear ϕˆ the accuracy can be approximated analytically [55], for
many other choices of estimators this is more difficult. As such, this metric is hard to study from
an analytical perspective, especially its dependence on ϕ and n. This makes it hard to compare
privacy protocols.
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3.2 Current information-theoretic metrics
Many information-theoretic metrics are discussed in [52]; in the overview below we restrict our-
selves to those that have been used in the context of (local) DP. Note that in general a metric for
the centralised DP setting can also be applied to the LDP setting, since we can view LDP as the
repeated application of a DP protocol on single-user databases.
[41, 10, 39, 14, 56] propose leakage metrics which focus on the mutual information between
input and output (either in the localised or in the centralised case), or equivalently, privacy metrics
which focus on the uncertainty of the input given the output. Similar approaches to privacy are
used in the setting of biometric security [36] and genomic privacy [29]. [4, 6, 31, 45] define
privacy metrics based on min-entropy, representing a worst-case privacy loss, and bound this from
above by ε-DP.2 Continuing in this line, [3] uses a min-entropy utility measure and gives an upper
bound on utility in terms of ε-DP. Rényi-DP unifies entropic and min-entropic privacy [42].
Other authors [32, 53] use the mutual information between input and output as a utility metric
rather than a privacy metric, and give optimal privacy protocols for a given level of DP. Other
information-theoretic approaches to privacy involve the Kullback-Leibler distance between output
distributions [18, 32] and distortion theory [10, 47, 56].
A shared characteristic of the (min-)mutual information privacy and utility metrics is that any
information obtained by the aggregator is considered to contribute to utility, while any information
hidden from the aggregator is considered to contribute to privacy. By definition, this leads to a
situation where any gain in privacy automatically leads to a loss in utility and vice versa. How-
ever, privacy and utility deal with fundamentally different domains of information [37]. Utility is
an aggregate construct, and a utility metric should reflect to what extent the aggregator is able to
recover information about the userbase as a group. By contrast, privacy is an individual construct,
and a privacy metric should reflect to what extent an individual user is able to hide their private
information. Since most information-theoretic metrics from the literature do not make the distinc-
tion between aggregate and individual information, they do not accurately capture the notions of
privacy or utility. An exception is Mutual Information-Differential Privacy [14] in the central set-
ting, which uses conditioned mutual information because, as the authors argue, a strong adversary
which may have access to all users’ data except for one is implicit in ε-DP. Our privacy metric in
Def. 4.1 adapts this idea to the local setting.
4 New metrics
4.1 A case for average case
Many privacy metrics in (L)DP focus on a worst-case analysis. This can mean either looking at the
worst possible output [21], worst possible difference between two inputs [42], or worst possible
distribution on the input set [14]. The appeal is clear, as a worst case approach provides privacy
guarantees that always hold. Nevertheless, we believe that it is useful to also study privacy metrics
2See [24, 51, 30] for an overview of the many ways to define conditional entropy and mutual information analogous
to Rényi entropy, of which min-entropy is a specific instance.
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in which the constraints are somewhat relaxed, i.e. based on leakage analysis that is more average-
case than worst-case [25, 33, 42]. Such a metric can give a high privacy score even if there is the
occasional occurrence of large leakage. In this way, we can get an accurate picture of a protocol’s
overall privacy behaviour, rather than just the worst-case guarantees.
We believe that an average-case approach can be a useful tool alongside ε-LDP for the follow-
ing reasons. If worst-case privacy is one’s focus, an alternative to LDP would be to make use of
cryptographic solutions, e.g. Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). Protocols for tallying secret
values are well studied in the field of SMC [48, 38, 2]; they are not computationally expensive but
require more communication than LDP. While LDP protocols always have nonzero leakage, SMC
can offer strong privacy guarantees in many situations.3 Since LDP invariably involves some loss
of privacy, it is beneficial to determine this loss for the typical user.
Furthermore, there may already be leakage about Xi through other channels than the reporting
of Yi. In practice, the aggregator can have access to information about a user’s device or geograph-
ical settings [49]. Also, the existence of correlations between users’ data allows the aggregator to
use multiple users’ reports to obtain more accurate information about a single user’s data [34, 14];
data from the same user over time can be used in the same way [49]. A malicious aggregator could
also use side information to perform timing, state, or privacy budget attacks [26]. Therefore, it
is interesting to know the effect of a protocol on a typical user’s privacy alongside the worst-case
guarantees, since in practice an attacker might have the capability of bypassing those guarantees
to some extent.
4.2 New metrics
We can formalise the distinction between aggregate and individual information discussed in section
3.2 using the language of information theory. The total information in the hands of the users is
H( ~X), while the part of this that the aggregator has at their disposal is I(~Y ; ~X). We can split both
of them up into three parts: the nonprivate part (the knowledge about P ), the group-private part
(the knowledge about T given P ), and the individual private part (the knowledge about ~X given
T ); this is shown in Table 4.1. As in the Table, these parts can be combined in three ways:
1. The group-private part and the individual private part together form the private information
H( ~X|P ) on the side of the users. We do not consider all information held by the users to be
private, as revealing the distribution P does not violate any user’s privacy. To see this, suppose
the tallies T for a group of n users are revealed. If n = 1, the single user’s privacy is completely
violated. However, as n grows larger, the amount of private information about a single user that can
be obtained from T decreases. In the limit n→∞, the tallies contain no private information about
a single user at all; but P represents the ‘tallies’ of an infinitely large population from which our
users are a sample. Hence the total private information is H( ~X|P ), while the private information
available to the aggregator (i.e. the privacy leakage) equals I(~Y ; ~X|P ). Note that this mirrors the
definition of leakage in the central setting in [14].
3Note that SMC outputs the true tallies, and as such does not protect a user’s privacy in the unlikely case that
all other users collude with the aggregator. Note also that SMC and (L)DP are not mutually exclusive, and one may
combine protocols to offer different kinds of data protection [1, 28].
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Nonprivate Group-private Individual private
Users I( ~X;P ) H(T |P ) H( ~X|T )
Total information H( ~X)
Private information H( ~X|P )
Tally-relevant H(T )
Distribution-relevant I( ~X;P )
Aggregator I(~Y ;P ) I(~Y ;T |P ) I(~Y ; ~X|T )
Total obtained information I(~Y ; ~X)
Privacy leakage I(~Y ; ~X|P )
Tally gains I(~Y ;T )
Distribution gains I(~Y ;P )
Table 4.1: The information split in the LDP setting.
2. The nonprivate part and the group-private part together form the information about talliesH(T ).
Its counterpart on the aggregator’s side, I(~Y ;T ), reflects how much the aggregator learns about the
tallies. Note that I(~Y ;T ) = I(S;T ), where S is as in section 2.4.
3. In the same way, the nonprivate part is the information about P available to the users or the
aggregator. Similar to the above, we have I(~Y ;P ) = I(S;P ).
We define a normalised notion of privacy by defining privacy as the fraction of private information
that is not leaked to the aggregator:
Definition 4.1. LetQ be a privacy protocol. Let µ be the aggregator’s prior. We define the average
privacy of Q as follows:
Sµ(Q) := 1−
I(~Y ; ~X|P )
H( ~X|P )
=
H( ~X|~Y , P )
H( ~X|P )
. (4.1)
The dependence on µ enters via the conditioning on P . Note that the denominator in the
fraction above is nonzero by (2.2). An important attribute of this privacy metric is that although its
definition depends on the number of users, its value does not:
Lemma 4.2. The average privacy Sµ(Q) =
H( ~X|~Y ,P )
H( ~X|P )
does not depend on n.
In the same way, we define utility as the fraction of relevant information that is available to the
aggregator:
Definition 4.3. Let n be the number of users, and let Q be a privacy protocol. We define the
distribution utility and tally utility of Q as follows:
Udistrn,µ (Q) :=
I(~Y ;P )
I( ~X;P )
; Utallyn,µ (Q) :=
I(~Y ;T )
H(T )
. (4.2)
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The denominators in the fractions above are nonzero by property (2.3). Defs. 4.1 and 4.3 have
a number of desirable properties:
1. Both utility and privacy have a clear intuitive meaning as the amount of relevant information
obtained by, or hidden from, the aggregator.
2. The utility metrics do not depend on the choice of estimator.
3. In contrast to other information-theoric metrics, our metrics take into account the fact that not
all obtained information is relevant to the aggregator, and not all revealed information violates a
user’s privacy.
4. Our privacy metric can also be applied in deterministic contexts. For instance, in Example 3.2,
assuming a symmetric Dirichlet prior on PA with parameter 12 (the Jeffreys prior, see section 10),
we find
Sµ(Q) =
̥
(
k+2
2
)
−̥
(
3
2
)
̥ (k + 1)−̥
(
3
2
) > 0, (4.3)
where ̥ is the digamma function. In contrast, according to the LDP metric this protocol does not
offer any privacy at all. See also Example 7.4.
5. Our metrics look at the average case. This means that our privacy metric will be less ‘strict’
than LDP, which looks at worst-case privacy; this will be formalised in Theorem 5.3.
6. Like the estimator-based metrics, our utility metrics depend on the number of users n. This
makes it difficult to compare protocols. However, in Theorem 6.7 we will show that a protocol can
be characterised by its asymptotic n→∞ behaviour Sstableµ , which we can explicitly compute.
The metrics can be computationally involved, especially for large n, a and b. In Section 10 we
discuss the computational complexity of the various metric, both in general cases and for specific
protocols.
Remark 4.4. In [32] the authors study the case that P can take only two possible values, and they
describe a method that is optimal in distinguishing these two cases, given the obfuscated data of
one user. In our language, this means that the support of µ contains two points. The metric Sn,µ
generalises this scenario4 in two ways: we allow any prior distribution µ, and any number of users.
Remark 4.5. In Table 4.1 one finds the identity I(~Y ; ~X) = I(~Y ;P ) + I(~Y ; ~X|P ). Since the first
term is related to (distribution) utility, and the second term is related to privacy, one might be led
to believe that this implies a sum law between privacy and utility. However, this is not the case, as
I(~Y ; ~X|P ) expresses the leakage, rather than the privacy, of the protocol Q. As such, this formula
expresses the idea “utility+ leakage= total information", which does not imply a relation between
utility and privacy, as the term I(~Y ; ~X) also depends on Q.
4The actual metric is different, as [32] focuses on Kullback-Leibler divergence rather than mutual information.
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4.3 Digit utility
The utility metrics introduced in the previous section are relative to the total amount of relevant
information in the unobfuscated data. This makes them useful for comparing protocols to the ideal
functionality and to each other. Nevertheless, in some cases it is useful to have a utility metric that
measures the aggregator’s information gain in an absolute way; we will now define such a metric
for the case that the aggregator is interested in P , and µ is a continuous probability distribution.
The distributionP itself then carries infinite information, but the aggregator can obtain only a finite
amount of this. One way to quantify the amount of information is to determine how many digits
of P the aggregator has learned. This leads us to the following definition:
Definition 4.6. Let Q be a faithful privacy protocol, and let the prior µ be a continuous measure
on PA. We define the digit utility of Q as
Udigitn,µ (Q) :=
I(~Y ;P )− h(P )
a− 1
. (4.4)
The intuition behind the digit utility is that it approximates how many digits (in base e) of P
the aggregator has learned. Note that this is essentially a rescaling of Udistrn,µ (Q), and that it does
not carry extra information about Q.
Lemma 4.7. For d ∈ R≥0, let P〈d〉 be the discretisation of P with coordinate-wise step size e−d,
i.e. centered on the lattice (e−dZ)a. Then
limn→∞
(
I(~Y ;P )− H(P〈Udigitn,µ (Q)〉)
)
= 0. (4.5)
In other words, for large n the amount of information the aggregator has about P is approxi-
mately equivalent to the amount of information gained from learning the first Udigitn,µ (Q) digits of
P . The digit utility thus provides an information-theoretic analogon to the accuracy utility metric
in Def. 3.3. It has the additional advantage that we do not need to specify a distance measure or an
estimator. It is a useful metric if the aggregator is interested in knowing P up to some established
accuracy. After the aggregator has chosen a protocol, the digit utility can be used to tell him how
many users are needed to obtain the desired accuracy.
5 Worst case privacy
In our formalism, a measure for worst-case privacy is obtained by taking the infimum of the hidden
information over all outcomes y ∈ B and all prior distributions µ:
Definition 5.1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be arbitrary, and let M be the set of all probability measures
on PA satisfying (2.2). Let Q be a privacy protocol. Then we define the worst-case privacy of Q
to be
Swc(Q) := infµ∈M infy∈B
H(Xi|Yi = y, P )
H(Xi|P )
. (5.1)
12
In other words, Swc(Q) is the fraction of the user’s private information that remains hidden from
the aggregator, when assuming the worst possible prior distribution µ and user output y. Trivially
the following result holds:
Lemma 5.2. Let Q be a privacy protocol. Then Sµ(Q) ≥ S
wc(Q) for any prior measure µ.
It turns out that this notion of worst-case privacy is directly related to LDP:
Theorem 5.3. Let Q be a privacy protocol. Then Swc(Q) = e−LDP(Q).
This theorem shows that LDP has a direct information-theoretic interpretation as a measure of
worst case privacy.
Remark 5.4. Alternatively, one could define worst-case privacy as infp∈PA infy∈B
H(Xi|Yi=y,P=p)
H(Xi|P=p)
.
It turns out that this is equivalent to Def. 5.1, see appendix B. The worst case is as follows: let
y, x, x′ be such that
Q˜y|x
Q˜y|x′
is maximal, i.e.
Q˜y|x
Q˜y|x′
= eLDP(Q). For ε ∈ (0, 1), let pε ∈ PA be of the
form pεx = 1− ε, p
ε
x′ = ε, and all other probabilities equal to 0. Then we obtain the infimum when
Yi = y, and we let P = limε→0 pε. In other words, the most information will be leaked when a user
outputs an y for which the x that maximises Q˜y|x occurs with probability almost 1. In this case,
the combination of the knowledge about the prior, plus the fact that the user outputs y, allows the
aggregator to conclude Xi = x with optimal certainty.
Remark 5.5. Theorem 5.3 gives a better understanding of Example 3.2. The ‘reason’ that LDP(Q) =
∞ here (or equivalently Swc(Q) = 0) is that there is a prior under which Q reveals all information;
for example, if the support of µ is contained in P{1,2} ⊂ P{1,··· ,2k} (so that it is known a priori that
users can only have values 1 and 2 as their private data), thenXi becomes known to the aggregator
when he learns Yi.
6 Limit behaviour of the utility
Throughout this section we assume that the prior µ is continuous. Although our utility metrics
depend on the number of users n, it turns out that their asymptotic behaviour can be explicitly
calculated. The main result is formulated in Theorem 6.7.
6.1 Faithful protocols
Before we dive into metrics we want to define a certain class of privacy protocols that will turn out
to be ‘optimal’ with respect to utility for asymptotically many users.
Definition 6.1. Let Q be a privacy protocol for A. We say Q is faithful if rk(Q˜) = a.
The importance of faithfulness is highlighted by the following Proposition.
Proposition 6.2. Let Q be a privacy protocol for A. Then Q is faithful if and only if the map
Q∗ : PA → PB is injective.
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Informally, this Proposition tells us that if Q is not faithful, then there will be p, p′ ∈ PA for
which the aggregator will not be able to distinguish P = p from P = p′. For this reason non-
faithful privacy protocols only have a limited role in our discussions; indeed, the main privacy
protocols from the literature are all faithful (they come with unbiased estimators). Nevertheless,
non-faithful privacy protocols are still useful in the situation where the support of the prior µ is
limited. For example, in [32] the situation is studied where there are only two possibilities for P ,
and indeed one of the main results is that in the high privacy regime the optimal privacy protocol
is not faithful.
6.2 Limit behaviour
We need three more definitions before we can state the main result.
Definition 6.3. LetQ = (Q˜,B) be a privacy protocol onA. Let B>0 = {y ∈ B : ∃x s.t. Q˜y|x > 0}.
We let ∼ be the equivalence relation on B>0 generated by the relation {(y, y′) : ∃x s.t. Q˜y|x >
0, Q˜y′|x > 0}. We write B>0/∼ for the set of equivalence classes under this equivalence relation.
Definition 6.4. Let A1, A2, · · · and B1, B2, · · · be infinite sequences of real numbers. We write
An
∞
−→ Bn if limn→∞(An − Bn) = 0.
Definition 6.5. Let Q = (Q˜,B) be a faithful privacy protocol for A. For p ∈ PA, let Dp :=
diag
(
1
(Q˜p)1
, · · · , 1
(Q˜p)b
)
. We define the asymptotic utility of Q to be
Uasµ (Q) = −
1
2
log(2πe) +
1
2a− 2
EP log det(Q˜
TDP Q˜). (6.1)
Furthermore, we define Cµ := U
as
µ (idA) = −
1
2
log(2πe)− 1
2a−2
EP
∑
x logPx. It turns out that
this is an upper bound on asymptotic utility.
Lemma 6.6. For any faithful privacy protocol Q on A one has Uasµ (Q) ≤ Cµ.
This allows us to formulate the following result, which describes the asymptotic behaviour of
our utility measures, and motivates the terminology ‘asymptotic utility’:
Theorem 6.7. Let Q be a privacy protocol, and let d := rk(Q˜). Let B>0/∼ be as in Def. 6.3, and
let b′ := #(B>0/∼). Then
1. There exists a constant rµ(Q) such that I(~Y ;P )
∞
−→ d−1
2
log n+ rµ(Q). If Q is faithful, then
rµ(Q) = (a− 1)U
as
µ (Q) + h(P ).
2. There exists a constant sµ(Q) such that I(~Y ;T )
∞
−→ d+b
′−2
2
logn + sµ(Q).
From this we can derive the following result about the limit behaviour of utility metrics:
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Corollary 6.8. Let Q be a privacy protocol. Let b′ = #(B>0/∼) and d = rk(Q˜). Then for every
privacy protocol Q the following holds as n→∞:
Udistrn,µ (Q)
∞
−→
d− 1
a− 1
; (6.2)
Utallyn,µ (Q)
∞
−→
d+ b′ − 2
2a− 2
. (6.3)
Furthermore, if Q is faithful then
Udigitn,µ (Q)
∞
−→
1
2
log(n) + Uasµ (Q); (6.4)
1− Udistrn,µ (Q)
∞
−→ 2
Cµ−U
as
µ (Q)
log n
. (6.5)
This Corollary shows that for asymptotically large n faithful protocols (which have d = a) have
higher utility than other protocols. Also, note that privacy protocols with a high value of Uasµ (Q)
have both good digit and distribution utilities for asymptotically large n; this motivates the term
‘asymptotic utility’.
Remark 6.9.
1. Typical privacy protocols are faithful, and they satisfy b′ = 1; one can have b′ > 1 only if
LDP(Q) = 0. As such, most generally used privacy protocols satisfy Udistrn,µ
∞
−→ 1, Utallyn,µ
∞
−→ 1
2
.
2. The fact that Udigitn,µ (Q)
∞
−→ 1
2
log(n) +Uasµ (Q) tells us that for large n, we know approximately
the first 1
2
log(n) + Uasµ (Q) digits of P , i.e. the accuracy to which we know P is approximately
eU
digit
n,µ (Q) ≈ c·n−1/2. This mirrors the fact that the standard deviation of linear frequency estimators
also scales as n−1/2 for large n [55].
The relation between the constant Uasµ (Q) and the asymptotic behaviour of the protocol Q can
also be formulated in a different way:
Definition 6.10. Let µ be continuous, and let Q be a faithful privacy protocol. We define the
effective participation factor of Q to be Fµ(Q) := e2U
as
µ (Q)−2Cµ .
Note that by Lemma 6.6 one has Fµ(Q) ∈ (0, 1]. The terminology ‘effective participation
factor’ is motivated by the following Proposition:
Proposition 6.11. Let µ be continuous, and let Q be a privacy protocol.
1. If Q is faithful, then for n→∞ we get Udigitn,µ (Q)
∞
−→ Udigit⌊Fµ(Q)·n⌋,µ(idA).
2. IfQ is not faithful, then for every ε > 0 we haveUdigitn,µ (Q) < U
digit
⌊ε·n⌋,µ(idA) for all sufficiently
large n.
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In words: for large n, the aggregator learns as much about P from the obfuscated data of n
users as they would from the un-obfuscated data of Fµ(Q) · n users. The factor Fµ(Q) represents
the factor in efficiency the aggregator pays for using the privacy protocol. Because of the second
point we define Fµ(Q) = 0 for non-faithful Q.
To summarise this section, we have shown that I(~Y ;P ) grows as c1 log n + c2 for large n
and for some constants c1, c2. The constant c1 is maximal if Q is faithful, while the constant c2
can be explicitely calculated for faithful protocols. For faithful Q, another way to express their
asymptotic utility is by their effective participation factor Fµ, which expresses the information in
the obfuscated data as equivalent to the information in the true data of a smaller number of users.
7 Combining protocols
We look at the behaviour of our metrics when protocols are combined in different ways. It turns
out that we can recover many properties of more established privacy metrics.
7.1 Postprocessing
A key property of privacy is that further processing of the obfuscated data should not decrease the
privacy, and it should not increase the utility. Formally we can define the sequential application of
multiple protocols as follows.
Definition 7.1. LetA be a finite set, letQ = (Q˜,B) be a privacy protocol onA, and letR = (R˜, C)
be a privacy protocol on B. Then the composition R ◦ Q is the privacy protocol on A defined by
R ◦Q := (R˜ · Q˜, C), where · denotes matrix multiplication.
It is easily verified that this is the ‘correct’ definition of composition, i.e. for every x ∈ A and
z ∈ C we have P((R ◦Q)(x) = z) = P(R(Q(x)) = z). Proposition 7.3 describes the behaviour of
our utility and privacy metrics under composition.
Definition 7.2. LetQ∗ : PA → PB be as in section 2.2. We letQ∗∗µ be the pushforward probability
measure on PB, i.e. for each measurable U ⊂ PB we have (Q∗∗µ)(U) = µ(Q−1∗ U).
Proposition 7.3. Let Q = (Q˜,B) by a privacy protocol for A and let R = (R˜, C) be a privacy
protocol for B. Then
Udistrn,µ (R ◦Q) ≤ min{U
distr
n,µ (Q),U
distr
n,Q∗∗µ(R)}, (7.1)
Utallyn,µ (R ◦Q) ≤ U
tally
n,µ (Q), (7.2)
Sµ(R ◦Q) ≥ Sµ(Q), (7.3)
Swc(R ◦Q) ≥ Swc(Q). (7.4)
If µ is continuous we furthermore have
Udigitn,µ (R ◦Q) ≤ U
digit
n,µ (Q). (7.5)
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In this Proposition, (7.5) is equivalent to an analogous result about LDP [21]. (7.4) is the
analogous statement for the privacy metric Sµ.
Example 7.4. Let g ∈ {1, · · · , a} and let G = {1, . . . , g}. Let H be the set of hash functions
h : A → G. Let ε ∈ (0,∞). Local Hash [56] is the privacy protocol LHa,g,ε = (Q˜,H × G) that
can be described as follows: given x ∈ A, we first uniformly pick a random hash function h ∈ H,
and then we perform GRRg,ε on h(x), (see section 10.1). Intuitively, the data is obscured twice,
first by hashing into a smaller set of categories, and then applying the obfuscation protocol GRR.
One can calculate
Sµ(LH
a,g,ε) = Eh
[
Sµ(h) +
H(h(Xi)|P )
H(Xi|P )
Sh∗∗µ(GRR
g,ε)
]
. (7.6)
where h ∈ H is drawn from a uniform distribution on H, and h∗∗µ is the pushforward measure
as defined in Def. 7.2. This shows that the new privacy metric indeed ‘detects’ the effects of both
steps. On the other hand, the LDP metric only sees the privacy from the second step, as we have
LDP(LHa,g,ε) = LDP(GRRg,ε) = ε.
7.2 Privacy budget
A central concept in (L)DP is that of a privacy budget. It refers to the fact that when performing
multiple privacy protocols Q1, · · · , Qk on the same data simultaneously, each revealed outcome
Qj(Xi) will leak some private information about Xi, and giving the aggregator all the Qj(Xi)
will leak more information than any individual protocol. Formally, we can define the parallel
application of privacy protocols as follows:
Definition 7.5. Let A be a finite set, and let Q1 = (Q˜1,B1), · · · , Qk = (Q˜k,Bk) be k privacy
protocols on A. Then we define the product Q1 × · · · ×Qk to be the privacy protocol Q1 × · · · ×
Qk := (R˜, C), where C is the Cartesian product of sets
∏
j B
j , and R˜ ∈ [0, 1]
∏
j B
j×A is the matrix
given by
R˜y1,··· ,yk|x =
k∏
j=1
Q˜jyj |x. (7.7)
By definition, the product corresponds to simultaneously releasing Q1(x), · · · , Qk(x). A key
fact of LDP [21] is that the leakage of the product is at most the sum of the leakages, i.e.
LDP(Q1 × · · · ×Qk) ≤
∑
j
LDP(Qj). (7.8)
In other words, when using different protocols simultaneously, one only has a fixed amount of
‘admissible leakage’ that has to be distributed among the different protocols; this concept is known
as a privacy budget. A similar statement holds for the privacy metric Sµ; because this metric looks
at privacy rather than leakage, we have to take the complement 1 − Sµ to make a meaningful
statement.
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Proposition 7.6. Let Q1, · · · , Qk be k privacy protocols on A. Then
1− Sµ
(
Q1 × · · · ×Qk
)
≤
∑
j
(
1− Sµ(Q
j)
)
. (7.9)
7.3 Mixture
Apart from postcomposing privacy protocols or applying them in parallel, another way to combine
multiple privacy protocols into one is by creating a mixture protocol. Given privacy protocols
Q1, · · · , Qk and a weight vector w ∈ P{1,··· ,k}, their mixture Mw(Q1, · · · , Qk) is defined to be
the privacy protocol that, for an input x, first draws an index j ∈ {1, . . . , k} according to the
probability distribution w, and then outputs the pair (j, Qj(x)).
Definition 7.7. Let A be a finite set, and let Q1 = (Q˜1,B1), · · · , Qk = (Q˜k,Bk) be privacy
protocols on A. Let w ∈ P{1,··· ,k}. Then the w-mixture of (Q1, · · · , Qk) is the privacy protocol
Mw(Q
1, · · · , Qk) = (R˜, C) with
R˜(j,y)|x = wjQ˜
j
y|x, C =
⊔
j
Bj =
{
(j, y) : j ≤ k, y ∈ Bj
}
. (7.10)
One can view a mixture protocol as the local equivalent of what has been called parallel com-
position for DP protocols [43]. A key property of mixtures is that privacy behaves linearly under
privacy, while asymptotic utility behaves superlinearly:
Proposition 7.8. Let Q1, · · · , Qk be faithful privacy protocols on A, and let w ∈ P{1,··· ,k}. Then
Sµ
(
Mw(Q
1, · · · , Qk)
)
=
∑
j
wj Sµ(Q
j). (7.11)
If µ is continuous we furthermore have
Uasµ
(
Mw(Q
1, · · · , Qk)
)
≥
∑
j
wj U
as
µ (Q
j). (7.12)
Remark 7.9. If we take privacy protocols of the same privacy level, then the Theorem above tells
us that their mixture will also have the same privacy. The utility will at least be a weighed average
of their utilities, and in fact it can even supersede the maximum of the asymptotic utilities. As an
example, let A = {1, 2, 3}, and let Q1 and Q2 be the privacy protocols given by the matrices
Q˜1 :=

 1 0 00 2
3
1
3
0 1
3
2
3

 , Q˜2 :=

 23 13 01
3
2
3
0
0 0 1

 . (7.13)
Let µ be the Dirichlet distribution with parameters (1, 1, 1). Since this distribution is symmetric,
and Q1 and Q2 differ only by a permutation of the input and output set, they will have the same
privacy and asymptotic utility. In fact, using Def. 6.5 one can calculate that Uasµ (Q
1) = Uasµ (Q
2) =
−0.987. However, Uasµ (M( 1
2
, 1
2
)(Q
1, Q2)) = −0.691. This shows that for n sufficiently large, the
mixture will outperform both Q1 and Q2, while offering the same level of privacy.
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8 The tradeoff between utility and privacy
An important aspect of the LDP setting is the privacy-utility tradeoff. Intuitively, the more ‘ran-
dom’ a privacy protocol is, the less utility the aggregator will have, but the more the privacy of
the user is maintained. Since one cannot have perfect utility without a total loss of privacy or
vice versa, we are necessarily in a situation where we have to pick a protocol that lies somewhere
between these two extremes. Therefore, it is important to see to what extent this tradeoff can be
characterised. If one takes the viewpoint that any information obtained by the aggregator consti-
tutes utility, and any information withheld from the aggregator constitutes privacy, then clearly the
tradeoff is very direct, and for any privacy protocol the utility and privacy sum up to a constant.
For the new metrics introduced in this paper the tradeoff is far less direct, since privacy and utility
regard different domains of information. Nevertheless, we are able to provide an upper bound on
(asymptotic) utility in terms of (worst case) privacy:
Theorem 8.1. Let Q be a faithful privacy protocol, and let µ be continuous. Then
Uasµ (Q) ≤ −
1
2
log(2πe) + log
1− Swc(Q)
Swc(Q)
, (8.1)
Fµ(Q) ≤
e−2Cµ
2πe
(
1− Swc(Q)
Swc(Q)
)2
. (8.2)
Note that the two formulas above are straightforward consequences of each other. In general,
the upper bound will not be strict if a > 2. The upper bound is more meaningful in the high
privacy domain, as there Swc(Q) ≈ 1, and there it shows that Fµ(Q) should be small. If we take
the Jeffreys prior, one has Cµ → ∞ as a → ∞, which shows that for larger a one generally has
smaller values of Fµ for the same level of worst-case privacy. However, Cµ has no lower bound if
we range over all possible µ, so this Theorem does not yield an upper bound on Fµ(Q) that does
not depend on µ.
9 Posterior distributions
The utility measures introduced in this paper center on the mutual information between the out-
come vector ~Y obtained by the aggregator and the aggregator’s goal (either P or T ). This infor-
mation manifests itself in the posterior distribution of this goal given the outcome vector ~y; since
no information is lost in going from the received reports to the posterior distribution, the posterior
is the natural tool for the aggregator to use the user reports. Therefore it is important for the aggre-
gator to efficiently compute the posterior. In this section we discuss the (numerical) computation
of the posterior for P . We suppose that P is a smooth random variable, i.e. it has a probability
density function f as in (2.1).
Proposition 9.1. Let ~y ∈ Bn. For β ∈ B let sβ be defined as sβ := #{i : yi = β}. The posterior
distribution of P given the observation ~Y = ~y is
fP |~Y=~y(p) =
f(p)P(~Y = ~y|P = p)
C~y
(9.1)
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with
P(~Y = ~y|P = p) =
n∏
i=1
(Q˜p)yi =
∏
β∈B
[(Q˜p)β ]
sβ(~y) (9.2)
C~y = P(~Y = ~y) =
∫
p∈PA
f(p)P(~Y = ~y|P = p)dp. (9.3)
Let t(~x) be as in section 2.4. If the prior µ is a Dirichlet distribution with parameter α, then one
can write
fP |~Y=~y(p) =
1
C~y
∑
~x∈An
B(α + t(~x))
(∏
i
Q˜yi|xi
)
·∆α+t(~x)(p), (9.4)
C~y =
∑
~x∈An
B(α+ t(~x))
n∏
i=1
Q˜yi|xi. (9.5)
Note that this Proposition also covers the case where µ equals the Jeffreys prior. While (9.4) is a
more complicated formula for fP |~Y=~y(p), its advantage is that we can get the marginal distributions
of the Px directly from it, without doing any integration, as the marginal of a Dirichlet distribution
is a beta distribution (i.e. a Dirichlet distribution in 2 dimensions).
The p-dependence (9.2) of the posterior is easy to evaluate, but the overall normalisation con-
stantC (9.3) is computationally expensive. However, if the prior distribution is a Dirichlet distribu-
tion, there exist several efficient methods to obtain random samples [11, 8]. This makes it feasible
to perform a Monte Carlo integration in (9.3). Furthermore, for established privacy protocols we
can obtain less complicated formulas for the posterior (see Section 10).
10 Analysis of privacy protocols
In this section we discuss how various established protocols behave with respect to the newmetrics.
We will set the prior µ to be the Jeffreys prior, which is the Dirichlet measure on PA with
parameters αi = 1/2 for all i ∈ A (see section 2.5). This choice yields the following result for Cµ
(defined in section 6.2) and H(Xi|P ):
Cµ = −
1
2
log(2πe) +
a
2a− 2
(
̥
(a
2
)
−̥
(
1
2
))
, (10.1)
H(Xi|P ) = ̥
(
a + 2
2
)
−̥
(
3
2
)
. (10.2)
In section 10.3 we will discuss the computational complexity of the metrics discussed in this paper,
both for general protocols and for specific established protocols. It turns out that for concrete
protocols, the calculation will often be easier than it is in the general case.
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10.1 Generalised Randomised Response
Let ε ∈ R>0. The Generalised Randomised Response [57] is the privacy protocol GRR
a,ε =
(Q˜,B) on A satisfying B = A and
Q˜y|x =
{ eε
eε+a−1 , if y = x,
1
eε+a−1 , if y 6= x.
(10.3)
By design this privacy protocol satisfies LDP(GRRa,ε) = ε. In the Propositions below, we use the
abbreviated notation β := eε − 1.
Proposition 10.1. Let x ∈ A and i ≤ n both be arbitrary. Then
Sµ(GRR
a,ε) = 1−
εeε − aEPx [(1 + βPx) log(1 + βPx)]
(a + β) H(Xi|P )
, (10.4)
Uasµ (GRR
a,ε) = −
1
2
log(2πe) + log β −
a− 2
2a− 2
log(a + β)−
a
2a− 2
EPx log(1 + βPx).(10.5)
Note that Px follows a beta distribution with parameters (12 ,
a−1
2
), hence both the privacy and
the asymptotic utility of GRRa,ε are readily computed. We also find a more succinct description
of the posterior distribution:
Proposition 10.2. Let ~y ∈ An. The posterior distribution of P¯ given ~Y = ~y (or equivalently, given
S = s) under GRRa,ε, and given the Jeffreys prior distribution, equals
fP |~Y=~y(p) =
1
C~y
∏
x∈A
p
− 1
2
x (1 + βpx)
sx (10.6)
where
C~y =
∑
k∈ZA≥0:
∀x kx≤sx
B(k + α)β
∑
x kx
∏
x
(
sx
kx
)
. (10.7)
For GRR we can also find expressions for I(~Y ; P¯ ) that are more easily computed than the
general case (see appendix D.2). We can use this to compute Udistrn,µ (Q) and U
digit
n,µ (Q).
10.2 Unary Encoding
Let κ, λ ∈ [0, 1] with κ ≥ λ. Unary Encoding [55] with parameters (κ, λ) is defined to be the
privacy protocol UEa,κ,λ = (Q˜a,κ,λ, 2A) obtained as follows: Given an input x ∈ A, the output set
UEa,κ,λ(x) contains x with probability κ, and each of the other values with probability λ, and all
these probabilities are independent. As such, the associated matrix coefficient for x ∈ A, y ⊂ A is
Q˜a,κ,λy|x =
{
κ · λ#y−1 · (1− λ)a−#y, if x ∈ y,
(1− κ) · λ#y · (1− λ)a−#y−1, if x /∈ y;
(10.8)
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κ λ
Basic RAPPOR [23] e
ε/2
eε/2+1
1
eε/2+1
OUE [55] 1
2
1
eε+1
BLH [7, 55] e
ε
eε+1
1
2
Table 10.1: Three commonly used versions of UE.
= λ#y−1 · (1− λ)a−#y−1 · [λ(1− κ) + δx∈y(κ− λ)] . (10.9)
Note that LDP(UEa,κ,λ) = log κ(1−λ)
λ(1−κ)
. At LDP ε, some common choices of (κ, λ) are listed in
the Table 10.1.
For the privacy of UE we can derive a reasonably straightforward expression:
Proposition 10.3. For 0 ≤ g ≤ a, let Rs be the continuous random variable of the form Rg =
λg−1(1−λ)a−g−1(λ(1−κ)+(κ−λ)Bg), whereBg is drawn from a beta distributionwith parameters
( g
2
, a−g
2
); if g = 0 or g = a, let Bg be constant 0 or 1, respectively. Let Hb be the binary entropy
function (see section 2.3). Then
Sµ(UE
a,κ,λ) = 1−
−(a− 1)Hb(λ)−Hb(κ)−
∑a
g=0
(
a
g
)
ERg [Rg logRg]
H(Xi|P )
. (10.10)
Unfortunately, we do not know of the existence of a ‘simple’ formula for any of the utility
measures introduced in this paper. Nevertheless, one can calculate I(~Y ;P ) (and with that the digit
and distribution utility) more efficiently than in the general case, see appendix D.3.
10.3 Overview of computation complexity
In this section we give an overview of how computationally involved the various metrics are. In
Table 10.2, 〈x, y〉means that to compute the value of the metric, we need to compute x different y-
dimensional integrals (y = 0means that we need to compute x constants). TheO-symbol refers to
the behaviour in n as n→∞. As one can see, for UE, and especially for GRR, we can significantly
improve the computational complexity of the posterior of the marginals and Sµ. With regards to
Udistrn,µ and U
digit
n,µ , we have found a way to increase the number of summands, but the summands no
longer contain integrals. In practice, this makes computing these metrics easier.
10.4 Numerical comparisons
We use the new metrics to compare different privacy protocols. In Figure 2 the average privacy,
for a fixed level of worst-case privacy, is plotted against a for different privacy protocols. As one
can see, there is a big difference between average and worst-case privacy, that only grows with a.
For large a, GRR offers more privacy on average for the same level of worst-case privacy than the
various versions of UE.
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general GRR (b = a) UE (b = 2a)
Udistrn,µ 〈O(n
b−1), a〉 〈O(n2a−1), 0〉+ 〈1, 1〉 〈O(n1+(a+1)2
a−1
), 0〉+ 〈O(1), 1〉
Utallyn,µ 〈O(n
a−1), a〉+ 〈O(nab−1), 0〉 = gen. = gen.
Sµ 〈O(1), a〉 〈O(1), 1〉 〈O(1), 1〉
Udigitn,µ 〈O(n
b−1), a〉 〈O(n2a−1), 0〉+ 〈1, 1〉 〈O(n1+(a+1)2
a−1
), 0〉+ 〈O(1), 1〉
Uasµ hard
5 easy6 =gen.
posterior7 〈O(nb(a−1), 0〉 〈O(na), 0〉 = gen.
Table 10.2: Computational complexity of the metrics.
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Figure 2: Privacy vs worst-case privacy for GRR and UE, for varying a (ε = 2).
In Figure 3 we plot the tradeoff between (asymptotic) utility and (average and worst-case)
privacy for GRR and UE, by varying the parameter ε. Note that all protocols have Swc → 0 as
ε → ∞. In this limit case GRR and basic RAPPOR also satisfy Sµ → 0 and Fµ → 1. On the
other hand, for OUE and BLH both Sµ and Fµ converge to nontrivial values as ε → 1. As ε→ 0,
all protocols satisfy Swc, Sµ → 1 and Fµ → 0. Interestingly, the best protocol to use depends on
one’s privacy metric: For a given level of average privacy, the best utility is offered either by OUE
(in the high privacy domain) or basic RAPPOR (in the low privacy domain). For a given level of
worst-case privacy, the best utility is offered by GRR.
11 Future work
This paper suggests several directions for future research. On the theoretical side, further research
is needed into formal aspects of the privacy-utility tradeoff. While Theorem 8.1 characterises the
tradeoff in terms of worst-case privacy, for a more complete understanding of the relation between
privacy and security we would like to have a theoretical result that establishes the relation between
Sµ(Q) and any of the utility metrics. Furthermore, apart from such a theoretical approach, we
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Figure 3: Privacy-utility tradeoff for GRR and UE by varying ε between 0 and ∞ (a = 3). The
axes in (b) are scaled by their square root for legibility.
would like to have a way to find optimal privacy protocols, i.e. for a given prior distribution
and number of users and a chosen level of privacy L, find the privacy protocol Q that maximises
Udistrn,µ (Q) while satisfying Sµ(Q) ≤ L.
On the more practical side, the biggest disadvantage of the new metrics is that they can be
computationally complex. Although the results in section 10.3 show that for GRR and UE we
are able to find faster ways to compute metrics than the general case, we have not found a way
to do this for all metrics, or for general privacy protocols. Ultimately, we would want to find
approximations to the utility and privacy metrics that are easily computed, and for which we can
prove that they bear a close relation to the actual metrics.
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A Short Proofs
In this appendix, we provide proofs for the mathematical statements in the main text, except for
those in Sections 5, 6, and 10. The proofs of those sections require more preliminary work and are
treated in the other appendices.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Given P , the Xi are independent and all have the same probability distribu-
tion, hence
H( ~X|~Y , P )
H( ~X|P )
=
∑
iH(Xi|Yi, P )∑
iH(Xi|P )
=
n · H(X1|Y1, P )
n · H(X1|P )
=
H(X1|Y1, P )
H(X1|P )
, (A.1)
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of which the right hand side does not depend on n.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. Since P is a continuous random variable on the (a − 1)-dimensional affine
space PA, one has that H(P〈d〉) ≈ h(P ) + (a− 1)d. The Lemma follows from substituting this in
(4.4).
Proof of Proposition 6.2. First suppose Q is faithful. By definition this means that rk(Q˜) = a,
hence Q˜, as a map Ra → Rb, is injective. In general, Q∗ acts on PA by p 7→ Q˜ · p. Since Q˜ is
injective, this means that Q∗ is injective.
Now suppose Q is not faithful, and let v ∈ RA \ {0} be such that Q˜v = 0. Then
0 =
∑
y
(Q˜v)y =
∑
y
∑
x
Q˜y|xvx =
∑
x
vx. (A.2)
Let p ∈ PA be such that all px are positive. Then for all λ ∈ R>0 one has
∑
x(p + λv)x = 1. By
taking λ ∈ R>0 small enough, one can also insure that (p+λv)x ≥ 0 for all x. Then p+λv ∈ PA,
but by definition one has Q∗(p + λv) = Q˜ · (p + λv) = Q˜ · p = Q∗p. This shows that Q∗ is not
injective.
Proof of Proposition 7.3. Write Zi = R(Yi) = (R ◦Q)(Xi). The Yi are each drawn independently
fromQ∗P , which is a random variable on PB drawn from the probability distributionQ∗∗µ defined
in Def. 7.2; as such one has Udistrn,Q∗∗µ(R) =
I(~Z;Q∗P )
I(~Y ;Q∗P )
. Furthermore, we have two Markov chains
P → ~X → ~Y → ~Z and P → Q∗P → ~Y → ~Z. The first one implies I( ~X ;P ) ≥ I(~Y ;P ) ≥
I(~Z;P ). Since Q∗ is a deterministic function, the second Markov chain shows that I(~Y ;P ) =
I(~Y ;Q∗P ) and I(~Z;P ) = I(~Z;Q∗P ). Putting this together, we get
Udistrn,µ (R ◦Q) =
I(~Z;P )
I( ~X ;P )
≤
I(~Y ;P )
I( ~X ;P )
= Udistrn,µ (Q); (A.3)
Udistrn,µ (R ◦Q) =
I(~Z;P )
I( ~X ;P )
≤
I(~Z;P )
I(~Y ;P )
=
I(~Z;Q∗P )
I(~Y ;Q∗P )
= Udistrn,Q∗∗µ(R); (A.4)
Udigitn,µ (R ◦Q) =
I(~Z;P )− h(P )
a− 1
≤
I(~Y ;P )− h(P )
a− 1
= Udigitn,µ (Q). (A.5)
This proves (7.1) and (7.5). Analogous to the above we also get I(~Z;T ) ≤ I(~Y ;T ), hence
Utallyn,µ (R ◦Q) =
I(~Z;T )
H(T )
≤
I(~Y ;T )
H(T )
= Utallyn,µ (Q), (A.6)
which proves (7.2). For any individual i we have the same Markov chain P → Xi → Yi → Zi,
hence equation (7.3) is proven by
Sµ(R ◦Q) =
H(Xi|Zi;P )
H(Xi|P )
≥
H(Xi|Yi;P )
H(Xi|P )
= Sµ(Q). (A.7)
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It is a standard result for (local) differential privacy that LDP(R ◦ Q) ≤ LDP(Q) [21]. To prove
(7.4), note that it follows from Theorem 5.3:
Swc(R ◦Q) = e−LDP(R◦Q) ≥ e−LDP(Q) = Swc(Q). (A.8)
Proof of Proposition 7.6. For simplicity, we prove this only for k = 2, as the general case easily
follows by induction. In this case we write Y 1i := Q
1(Xi), Y 2i := Q
2(Xi). Since Y 1i and Y
2
i are
independent givenXi, we get that H(Y 1i , Y
2
i |Xi) = H(Y
1
i |Xi) + H(Y
2
i |Xi); hence
I(Y 1i , Y
2
i ;Xi|P )−I(Y
1
i ;Xi|P )−I(Y
2
i ;Xi|P ) = H(Y
1
i , Y
2
i |P )−H(Y
1
i |P )−H(Y
2
i |P ) ≤ 0. (A.9)
It follows that
1−Sµ(Q
1×Q2) =
I(Y 1i , Y
2
i ;Xi|P )
H(Xi|P )
≤
I(Y 1i ;Xi|P ) + H(Y
2
i ;Xi|P )
H(Xi|P )
= (1−Sµ(Q
1))+(1−Sµ(Q
2)).
(A.10)
Proof of Proposition 7.8. Let J ∈ {1, · · · , k} be random with probability vector w, and set R :=
Mw(Q
1, · · · , Qk). then H(Xi|R(Xi), P ) = EJ
[
H(Xi|Q
J(Xi), P )
]
. To prove (7.11), observe that
from this it follows that
Sµ(Mw(Q1, · · · , Qk)) =
H(Xi|R(Xi), P )
H(Xi|P )
=
∑
j
wj
H(Xi|Q
j(Xi), P )
H(Xi|P )
=
∑
j
wj Sµ(Q
j).
(A.11)
Now let p ∈ PA. WriteMw(Q1, · · · , Qk) = (R˜,
⊔
j B
j). Then for any x, x′ ≤ a one has
(R˜TDpR˜)x,x′ =
∑
(j,y)∈
⊔
j B
j
w2j Q˜
j
y|xQ˜
j
y|x′∑
x′′ wjQ˜
j
y|x′′
=
∑
j
wj
∑
y∈Bj
Q˜jy|xQ˜
j
y|x′∑
x′′ Q˜
j
y|x′′
=
∑
j
wj((Q˜
j)TDpQ˜
j)x,x′.
(A.12)
Since log det is concave on positive definite symmetric matrices, we find that
log(det(R˜TDpR˜) ≥
∑
j
wj log(det((Q˜
j)TDpQ˜
j). (A.13)
Applying this to Def. 6.5 gives us (7.12).
Proof of Theorem 8.1. For this proof, it is more convenient to use the description of Uasµ (Q) from
Lemma C.7, and the definition of JQ∗p given in its proof, i.e. its diagonal entries are given by
(JQ∗p)x,x =
∑b
y=1
(Q˜y|x−Q˜y|a)
2
(Q∗p)y
. Let y ≤ b and x < a; then one has |Q˜y|x − Q˜y|a| ≤ (eLDP(Q) −
1)2minx′ Q˜y|x′ and (Q∗p)y ≥ minx′ Q˜y|x′ . It follows that
(JQ∗p)x,x ≤
∑
y
(eLDP(Q) − 1)2(minx Q˜y|x)2
my
≤
∑
y
(eLDP(Q) − 1)2my = (e
LDP(Q) − 1)2. (A.14)
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By Theorem 5.3, the right hand side is equal to (1−S
wc(Q))2
(Swc(Q))2
. By Hadamard’s inequality we know
that the determinant of a positive definite matrix is at most the product of its diagonal elements,
hence log(det(JQ∗p)) ≤ (2a − 2) log
1−Swc(Q)
Swc(Q)
. If we plug this in into Lemma C.7 we find (8.1).
We get (8.2) directly from substituting this into Def. 6.10.
Proof of Proposition 9.1. For p ∈ PA one has fP |~Y=~y(p) =
f(p)P(~Y=~y|P=p)
P(~Y=~y)
. Given P = p, each Yi
is drawn fromB independently with probability distribution Q˜p; this proves (9.2), and (9.3) follows
directly from this. Now suppose µ is a Dirichlet distribution with parameter α, then fP (p) =
B(α)−1
∏
γ∈A p
αγ−1
γ and
P(~Y = ~y|P = p) =
∑
~x∈An
P(~Y = ~y| ~X = ~x)P( ~X = ~x|P = p) =
∑
~x∈An
prodiQ˜yi|xi ·
∏
γ∈A
ptγ(~x)γ .
(A.15)
Applying this to (9.1), we find
fP |~Y=~y(p) =
1
P(~Y = ~y) · B(α)
∑
~x
∏
i
Q˜yi|xi
∏
γ∈A
pαγ+tγ(~x)−1γ (A.16)
which shows that the posterior distribution is proportional to∑
~x
B(α + t(~x))
∏
i
Q˜yi|xi ·∆α+t(~x)(p). (A.17)
We get the right constant from the fact that each Dirichlet distribution is a probability distribution,
hence its integral over all PA equals 1.
B Proofs for worst-case privacy
The main goal of this section is to prove Theorem 5.3. First we present the proof of the other
statement of section 5.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. Let µ be a prior distribution on PA. Then
Swc(Q) ≤ infy∈B
H(Xi|Y = y, P )
H(Xi|P )
≤ Ey
[
H(Xi|Y = y, P )
H(Xi|P )
]
= Sµ(Q). (B.1)
Before we give the proof of the main Theorem, we first need two auxiliary Lemmas.
Lemma B.1. Let X be a measure space with measure χ, and let f, g : X → R≥0 be two functions
with g(x) > 0 for all x and 0 <
∫
x∈X
g(x)dχ <∞. Then∫
x∈X
f(x)dχ∫
x∈X
g(x)dχ
≥ infx∈X
f(x)
g(x)
. (B.2)
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Proof. Let ν be the probability measure on X given by ν(U) = 1∫
x∈X g(x)dχ
∫
x∈U
g(x)dχ. Then the
left hand side of (B.2) equals
∫
x∈X
f(x)
g(x)
dν = EX∼ν
[
f(X)
g(X)
]
, which proves the Lemma.
Lemma B.2. Let t ∈ (0, 1) and A,B ∈ R≥0 with (A,B) 6= (0, 0). Then
At
At+B(1−t)
log At
At+B(1−t)
t log t
≥ min
{
A
B
,
B
A
}
. (B.3)
Proof. Note that the statement is trivially true if either A = 0 or B = 0, so we now suppose that
neither is the case. Suppose A ≤ B, and let σ := A
B
. Consider the function f : (0, 1) → R given
by f(t) = log σ − log(1 − (1 − σ)t) + (1 − σ)t log t. Then d
2f
dt2 =
(1−σ)2
(1−(1−σ)t)2
+ 1−σ
t
≥ 0, so f
is convex; as such its supremum is the limit to one of the endpoints. Since limt→1 f(t) = 0 and
limt→0 f(t) = log σ ≤ 0, we have f(t) ≤ 0 for all t ∈ (0, 1). However, we can rewrite
0 ≥ f(t) = log
At
At+B(1− t)
−
At+B(1− t)
B
log t, (B.4)
which we can rewrite into
At
At+B(1−t)
log At
At+B(1−t)
t log t
≥
A
B
, (B.5)
which is what we needed to show. If B ≤ A, define g(t) = σ
σt+1−t
log σt
σt+1−t
− log t
σ
. Then, since
σ ≥ 1, we have dgdt =
(σ−1)[(1−t)(1−t+(t+1)σ)+σ2 t log 1+(σ−1)tt+(σ−1)t ]
σt(1+(σ−1)t)2
≥ 0, hence g(t) ≤ limt′→1 g(t′) = 0.
Analogous to the above we can rewrite this into
At
At+B(1−t)
log At
At+B(1−t)
t log t
≥
B
A
. (B.6)
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Without loss of generality, we assume thatQ is ‘surjective’ in the sense that
for every y ∈ B there exists an x ∈ A such that Q˜y|x > 0. For any probability measure µ on PA
and y ∈ B we have
H(Xi|Yi = y, P )
H(Xi|P )
=
Ep[H(Xi|Yi = y, P = p)]
Ep[H(Xi|P = p)]
. (B.7)
Let P˚A be the interior of PA, i.e. the set of those p such that all px > 0. SinceH(Xi|Yi = y, P = p)
and H(X|P = p) are continuous functions in p, we can obtain the infimum over all µ by restricting
those for which µ(P˚A) = 1. Taking such a µ, we can invoke Lemma B.1, which now tells us that
H(Xi|Yi = y, P )
H(Xi|P )
≥ infp∈P˚A
H(Xi|Yi = y, P = p)
H(Xi|P = p)
. (B.8)
So we are reduced from finding the optimal µ to finding the optimal P . Invoking Lemma B.1 with
χ the counting measure on A, we get
H(Xi|Yi = y, P = p)
H(Xi|P = p)
=
∑
x∈A P(Xi = x|Yi = y, P = p) log
1
P(Xi=x|Yi=y,P=p)∑
x∈A P(Xi = x|P = p) log
1
P(Xi=x|P=p)
(B.9)
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≥ minx∈A
P(Xi = x|Yi = y, P = p) log
1
P(Xi=x|Yi=y,P=p)
P(Xi = x|P = p) log
1
P(Xi=x|P=p)
(B.10)
= minx∈A
Qy|xpx∑
x′ Qy|x′p
′
x
log
Qy|xpx∑
x′ Qy|x′p
′
x
px log px
. (B.11)
Let x ∈ A. If we apply Lemma B.2 to t = px, A = Qy|x and B =
∑
x′ 6=xQy|x′
px′
1−px
, we find
Qy|xpx∑
x′ Qy|x′p
′
x
log
(
Qy|xpx∑
x′ Qy|x′p
′
x
)
px log(px)
≥ min
{
Qy|x∑
x′ 6=xQy|x′
px′
1−px
,
∑
x′ 6=xQy|x′
px′
1−px
Qy|x
}
(B.12)
≥ min
{
Qy|x
maxx′ Qy|x′
,
minx′ Qy|x′
Qy|x
}
. (B.13)
By Def. 3.1, (B.13) is bounded from below by e−LDP(Q). Combined with (B.8) and (B.11) this
shows that
Swc(Q) = infµ infy
H(Xi|Yi = y, P )
H(Xi|P )
≥ e−LDP(Q). (B.14)
On the other hand, let y, x, x′ be such that
Qy|x
Qy|x′
= eLDP(Q). Let ε ∈ (0, 1), and let P ε ∈ PA be
of the form pεx = 1 − ε, p
ε
x′ = ε, and all other probabilities equal to 0. Let µ
ε be the probability
measure on PA which puts all its mass on pε. Define f(ε) = Sµε(Q); then
f(ε) =
Qy|x(1−ε)
Qy|x(1−ε)+Qy|x′ε
log
Qy|x(1−ε)
Qy|x(1−ε)+Qy|x′ε
+
Qy|x′ε
Qy|x(1−ε)+Qy|x′ε
log
Qy|x′ε
Qy|x(1−ε)+Qy|x′ε
(1− ε) log(1− ε) + ε log ε
. (B.15)
Applying l’Hôpital’s rule, we find
lim
ε→0
f(ε) = lim
ε→0
(
log ε− log(1− ε) + logQy|x′ − logQy|x
) Qy|x′Qy|x
(Qy|x′ε+Qy|x(1−ε))
2
log ε− log(1− ε)
(B.16)
=
Qy|x′
Qy|x
= e−LDP(Q), (B.17)
which shows that the lower bound in (B.14) can indeed be obtained in the limit.
From (B.8), and the fact that in the proof above we use a measure µε which puts all mass on a
single point, we also get the following Corollary:
Corollary B.3. Swc(Q) = infp∈PA infy∈B
H(Xi|Yi=y,P=p)
H(Xi|P=p)
.
C Proofs for section 6
In this appendix we prove the statements of section 6; it turns out these are by far the most mathe-
matically involved. Its main result, which is Theorem 6.7, is our main focus.
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C.1 Short proofs
From Theorem 6.7 we can prove the statements of section 6:
Proof of Lemma 6.6. For large n one has I(~Y ;P )
∞
−→ a−1
2
log n + h(P ) + (a − 1)Uasµ (Q) by
Theorem 6.7.1. Applying this to idA gives I( ~X ;P )
∞
−→ a−1
2
log n+ h(P ) + (a− 1) Cµ(Q). Since
P → ~X → ~Y is a Markov chain, we have I(~Y ;P ) ≤ I( ~X ;P ), which shows that Uasµ (Q) ≤
Cµ.
Proof of Corollary 6.8. Applying the terminology of Theorem 6.7 to the privacy protocol idA we
find d = a and b′ = a− 1. As such for general Q we find
Udistrn,µ (Q) =
I(~Y ;P )
I( ~X ;P )
∞
−→
d−1
2
logn + rµ(Q)
a−1
2
log n+ rµ(idA)
∞
−→
d− 1
a− 1
, (C.1)
which proves (6.2), and
Utallyn,µ (Q) =
I(~Y ;P ) + I(~Y ;T |P )
I( ~X ;P ) + I( ~X; T¯ |P )
∞
−→
d+b′−1
2
log n+ rµ(Q) + sµ(Q)
2a−2
2
log n+ rµ(idA) + sµ(idA)
∞
−→
d+ b′ − 1
2a− 2
, (C.2)
which proves (6.3). For faithful Q (6.4) follows from
Udigitn,µ (Q) =
I(~Y ;P )− h(P )
a− 1
∞
−→
a−1
2
log n+ (a− 1)Uasµ (Q)
a− 1
=
1
2
logn +Uasµ (Q). (C.3)
Furthermore, we prove (6.5) by writing (C.1) as
Udistrn,µ (Q)
∞
−→
a−1
2
log n+ (a− 1)Uasµ (Q) + h(P )
a−1
2
log n+ (a− 1) Cµ+h(P )
∞
−→ 1−
2(Cµ−U
as
µ (Q))
log n
. (C.4)
Proof of Proposition 6.11. By Theorem 6.7.1 one has
Udigit⌊Fµ(Q)·n⌋,µ(idA)
∞
−→
1
2
log Fµ(Q) +
1
2
logn + Cµ =
1
2
log n+Uasµ (Q) U
digit
n,µ (Q), (C.5)
which proves the first statement. The second statement also follows from Theorem 6.7.1, since
Udigit⌊ε·n⌋,µ(idA) grows as
a−1
2
log n, whereas Udigitn,µ (Q) grows as
d−1
2
logn, which is strictly smaller
by assumption.
Sections C.2–C.7 will be dedicated to proving Theorem 6.7.
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C.2 Sketch of the proof of Theorem 6.7.1
The first point of Theorem 6.7 is mathematically the most involved. Before we go into the proof,
it is helpful to give a brief sketch of the proof. As before, let S be the tallies of ~Y as in section 2.4.
1. Since I(~Y ;P ) = I(S;P ) = H(S) − H(S|P ), it suffices to find the asymptotic behaviour (as
n→∞) of the two terms on the right hand side.
2. For a given P = p, the random variable S is drawn from a multinomial distribution. Since the
Shannon entropy of a multinomial distribution is known, this gives us a formula for the asymptotic
behaviour of H(S|P ) (Lemma C.3).
3. Using a multivariate version of the de Moivre–Laplace theorem, we find a continuous random
variable Fn on PB such that H(S) ≈ h(Fn) + (b− 1) logn for large n (Lemma C.4). This reduces
the problem to determining the differential entropy of Fn.
4. We introduce a reparametrisation of (an open subset of) PB in (C.17). In this parametrisation
allows us to determine h(Fn) (Lemma C.6).
5. Finally, we calculate the constant term in the case that Q is faithful (Lemma C.9)
C.3 Preliminaries
Coordinates on PA and PB: Throughout the rest of this appendix, and only in this appendix, we
identify PA with the subset {(u1, · · · , ua−1) : ∀x, uy ≥ 0;
∑
x ux ≤ 1} ⊂ R
a−1, and PB with the
subset {(v1, · · · , vb−1) : ∀y, vy ≥ 0;
∑
y uy ≤ 1} ⊂ R
b−1. While this notation is less ‘natural’
than viewing elements of PA as a-dimensional vectors whose elements sum up to 1, in practice
this notation is more convenient for our computations. Although we regard elements u of PA as
(a − 1)-dimensional vectors (u1, · · · , ua−1), we will at times continue to use the notation ua :=
1 −
∑a−1
x=1 ux. The analogous statement holds for elements of PB. We write P˚A for the interior
of PA in Ra−1, i.e. P˚A = {(u1, · · · , ua−1) : ∀x, ux > 0;
∑
x ux < 1}, and we define P˚B in an
analogous manner.
Privacy Mechanism: We will make two assumptions on Q, which we may do without loss of
generality:
1. We assume that there is no y ≤ b such that Q˜y|x = 0 for all i ≤ a; we can always ensure this by
taking B = B>0. This does not change the constants that play a role in Theorem 6.7.
2. We assume that b > a. We can ensure this by (repeatedly) replacing Q by Q′ obtained as
follows: assume without loss of generality that b ∈ B>0. Then take Q′ = (R˜, C), where C =
{1, · · · , b+ 1}, and
R˜y|x =
{
Q˜y|x, if y < b,
1
2
Q˜b|x, if y ≥ b.
(C.6)
Then#C = #B+1, while rk(R˜) = rk(Q˜), Uasµ (Q) = U
as
µ (Q
′), and#(C>0/∼) = #(B>0/∼). By
repeating this if necessary, we can always get b > a without changing the constants of Theorem
6.7.
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In terms of the coordinates u ∈ PA, v ∈ PB, the map Q∗ : PA → PB can be written as follows:
Q∗ : R
a−1 → Rb−1 (C.7)
u 7→
(
Q˜y|a +
a−1∑
x=1
(Q˜y|x − Q˜y|a)ux
)
y<b
.
Note that assumption 1 above ensures that Q∗(P˚A) ⊂ P˚B. We write I := Q∗(PA) ⊂ Rb−1.
WLOG we may assume that the column space of Q˜ is spanned by its first d − 1 columns and
its last column. Then the map
ψ : Rd−1 → Rb−1 (C.8)
(w1, · · · , wd−1) 7→ Q∗(w1, · · · , wd−1, 0, · · · , 0)
gives a parametrisation of I; define I˜ := ψ−1(I) ⊂ Rd−1. Note that ψ is not a linear map, but it is
an affine map, i.e. there exist Ψ ∈ R(b−1)×(d−1) and ψ0 ∈ Rb−1 such that ψ(w) = Ψw + ψ0. Then
Ψ is the (b− 1)× (d− 1)-matrix satisfying Ψy,x = Q˜y|x − Q˜y|a for all y < b, x < d.
Multivariate de Moivre–Laplace: If r is a positive integer, m ∈ Rr, and A is a r × r positive
definite matrix, then we write Nm,A for the probability density function of the multivariate normal
distribution with meanm and covariance matrix A, i.e.
Nm,A(z) =
1√
(2π)r det(A)
exp
(
−1
2
zTA−1z
)
. (C.9)
If X ∼ Nm,A, then the differential entropy of X is given by h(X) = r2 log(2πe) +
1
2
log(det(C)).
For q a probability distribution on {1, · · · , r} with all qy > 0, let Cq be the (r − 1)× (r − 1)-
matrix given by (Cq)y,y′ = δy=y′q−1y + q
−1
r for all y, y
′ < r. Note that for any z, z′ ∈ Rr one
has
zTCqz
′ =
r−1∑
y=1
qyzyz
′
y + qr
(
r−1∑
y=1
zy
)(
r−1∑
y=1
z′y
)
. (C.10)
In particular, if we substitute z = z′, we find that CQ is positive definite. Abusing notation slightly,
for a v = (v1, · · · , vb−1) ∈ PB ⊂ Rb−1 we will write Cv for C(v1,··· ,vb−1,vb). The de Moivre–Laplace
theorem tells us that for large n, a multinomial distribution of n samples can be approximated by
a multivariate normal distribution:
Theorem C.1 (Multivariate de Moivre–Laplace Theorem [50]). Let L ∈ Zr≥0 be drawn from a
multinomial distribution with n items and probability vector q ∈ Rr>0. Then for large n and any
l ∈ Zr≥0 with
∑
y ly = n we have P(L = l) ≈ Nq,n−1C−1q (n
−1l1, · · · , n
−1lr−1).
It is convenient to have the following expression for det(Cq).
Lemma C.2. Let q be a probability distribution on {1, · · · , r}. Then det(Cq) =
∏r
y=1 q
−1
y .
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Proof. Let H = diag(q−11 , · · · , q
−1
r−1), and let e = (1, · · · , 1)
T ∈ Rr−1. Then Cq = H + p−1r ee
T,
so by the matrix determinant lemma [17] we find
det(Cq) = (1 + q
−1
r e
TH−1e) det(H) =
(
1 +
∑r−1
y=1 qi
qr
)
·
r−1∏
y=1
q−1y =
r∏
y=1
q−1y . (C.11)
The random variablesM and M˜ : Let M = Q∗P ; this is a continuous random variable on I˜ . Let
M˜ = ψ−1M ∈ I˜; let Γ be its probability density function, i.e. for all U ⊂ I˜ we have
P(M˜ ∈ U) =
∫
w∈U
Γ(w)dw =
∫
u∈Q−1∗ ψ(U)
∆(u)du. (C.12)
C.4 Reduction to continuous variables
The first step in proving Theorem 6.7.1 is to reduce the calculation of I(~Y ;P ) to the calculation
of the differential entropy of a continuous random variable on Rb−1. Let S be the tallies of ~Y
as in section 2.4; then I(~Y ;P ) = I(S;P ) = H(S) − H(S|P ). The following Lemma states the
asymptotic behaviour of the second term. Note that in the formula below, we regardM ∈ Rb−1 as
a (b− 1)-dimensional vector, but we nevertheless writeMb = 1−
∑b−1
y=1My as in section C.3.
Lemma C.3. One has H(S|P )
∞
−→ b−1
2
log(2πen) + 1
2
∑b
y=1 EM log(My).
Proof. For a given P = p the tally vector S is multinomially distributed with probability vector
m = Q∗p. As such we find, following [12], thatH(S|P = p)
∞
−→ b−1
2
log(2πen)+1
2
∑b
y=1 log(my).
From this we deduce
H(S|P ) = EpH(S|P = p)
∞
−→
b− 1
2
log(2πen) +
1
2
b∑
y=1
EM log(My). (C.13)
Unfortunately, the description of H(S) is more complicated. We will describe its asymptotic
behaviour in terms of a suitable continuous random variable. Let Fn be the continuous random
varirable on Rb−1 taken from a multivariate normal distribution with mean M and covariance
matrix n−1C−1M , where CM is as in section C.3. Let fn be the probability density function of Fn;
one has
fn(v) = EM
[
NM,n−1C−1M
(v)
]
. (C.14)
Lemma C.4. For large n one has H(S)
∞
−→ h(Fn) + (b− 1) logn.
Proof. We know that S is multinomially distributed with n items and probability vectorM . Using
Theorem C.1, we find that for a s ∈ Zb≥0 with
∑
y sy = n one has
P(S = s) ≈ EM
[
NM,n−1C−1M
(n−1s1, · · · , n
−1sb−1)
]
= fn(n
−1s1, · · · , n
−1sb−1). (C.15)
This shows that for large n, the discrete random variable (n−1S1, · · · , n−1Sb−1) ∈ PB approaches
the discretisation of Fn around the lattices (n−1Z)b−1. Since each lattice point represents a volume
of n1−b, this proves the Lemma.
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C.5 Reparametrisation
By Lemma C.4 it suffices to determine h(Fn) = −
∫
v∈Rb−1
fn(b) log(fn(b))db, so we want to
determine the behaviour of fn as n → ∞. It is convenient to introduce a reparametrisation of
(part of) the space Rb−1. For every m ∈ I we choose a matrix Ωm in R(b−1)×(b−d) satisfying the
following properties:
1. The map I → R(b−1)×(b−d) given bym 7→ Ωm is smooth.
2. Let Ψ be as in section C.3. Then ΨTCmΩm = 0(d−1)×(b−d) for eachm.
3. For each m, let Am be the (b − 1) × (b − 1)-matrix given in block form as (Ψ Ωm). Then
det(Am) = 1.
Note that we can always find such Ωm: The column vectors of Ψ are linearly independent, and
they span a subspace U of Rb−1. Since Cm is positive definite, it defines an inner product on Rb−1.
Let ω1,m, · · · , ωb−d,m be any basis of the orthogonal complement of Um with respect to this inner
product; then the matrix Ωm whose columns are the ωj,m satisfies point 2 above. By rescaling them
if necessary, it also satisfies point 3 (Here we use the assumption a < b, since this ensures that
there is at least one ωj,m). Since Um and Cm vary smoothly with m, we can do this for all m in
such a way that point 1 is satisfied as well.
It will be convenient to work with the two matrices Jm andKm introduced in the Lemma below.
Lemma C.5. Let m ∈ I. Define Jm := Ψ
TCmΨ and Km := Ω
T
mCmΩm. Then det(Cm) =
det(Jm) · det(Km).
Proof. Let Am be as in point 3 above. The columns of Jm are orthogonal to the columns of Km
with respect to the inner product defined by Cm, hence one has
ATmCmAm =
(
Jm 0(d−1)×(b−d)
0(b−d)×(d−1) Km
)
. (C.16)
Since det(Am) = 1, it follows that det(Cm) = det(ATmCmAm) = det(Jm) det(Km).
Define the map
ϕ : I˜ × Rb−d → Rb−1 (C.17)
(w, z) 7→ ψ(w) + Ωψ(w)z = Aψ(w)
(
w
z
)
+ ψ0.
For w ∈ I˜ , one has Dϕ(w, 0) = Aψ(w). Hence ϕ is injective on an open neighbourhood U˜ ⊂
I˜ × Rb−d of I˜ × {0}. Let U := ϕ(U˜); then ϕ gives a reparametrisation of U . In the next lemma,
we use this to find an expression for h(Fn).
Lemma C.6. One has h(Fn)
∞
−→ h(M˜) + b−d
2
log(2πen−1)− 1
2
EM [log detKM ].
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Proof. Define the continuous random variable Gn = (G1n, G
2
n) on R
d−1 × Rb−d by first drawing
M˜ according to Γ, and then taking G1n ∼ NM˜,n−1J−1M and G
2
n ∼ N0,n−1K−1M
. Then AM
(
G1n
G2n
)
+ ψ0
follows a normal distribution with meanAM
(
M˜
0
)
+ψ0 = M , and covariance matrix n−1C
−1
M ; hence
AM
(
G1n
G2n
)
+ ψ0 = Fn. For large n, we see that G1n converges in probability to M˜ , hence for Gn
in U˜ and for large n we have that Fn behaves as Aψ(G1n)
(
G1n
G2n
)
+ ψ0 = ϕ(Gn). As n → ∞ the
probability mass of Fn concentrates near I (and that of Gn near I˜). Furthermore, for w ∈ I˜ we
have |Dϕ(w, 0)| = |Aψ(w)| = 1. It follows that h(Fn)
∞
−→ h(Gn). Again using that G1n ≈ M˜ , we
find
h(Fn)
∞
−→ h(G1n, G
2
n)
∞
−→ h(M˜)+h(G2n|M˜) = h(M˜)+
b− d
2
log(2πen−1)−
1
2
EM [log detKM ].
(C.18)
The final ingredient is to relate the constant term in H(S) with Uasµ (Q) in the case that Q is
faithful. We postpone this to the next section, and give the proof of our main result here.
Proof of Theorem 6.7.1. We know that I(~Y ;P ) = H(S)− H(S|P ). Combining the Lemmas C.3,
C.4, and C.6, we see that I(~Y ;P ) converges to
d− 1
2
log(2πen) + h(M˜)−
1
2
EM
[
b∑
y=1
log(My) + log detKM
]
. (C.19)
If Q is faithful, then we apply Lemma C.9 to find the desired formula for rµ(Q).
C.6 The constant term for faithful Q
The last ingredient for Theorem 6.7.1 is Lemma C.9.
Lemma C.7. Let Q be faithful. Then Uasµ (Q) =
1
2
log(2πe) + 1
2a−2
EM log det JM .
Proof. In light of Def. 6.5, it suffices to show that for all p ∈ P˚A one has det(JQ∗p) = det(Q˜
TDpQ˜).
From the description of Ψ in section C.3, we find that for x, x′ < a we have (JQ∗p)x,x′ =
eTxΨ
TCQ∗pΨex′ = (Q˜•|x − Q˜•|a)
TCQ∗p(Q˜•|x′ − Q˜•|a). Applying (C.10) to this, we find
(JQ∗p)x,x′ =
b∑
y=1
(Q˜y|x − Q˜y|a)(Q˜y|x′ − Q˜y|a)
(Q∗p)y
. (C.20)
It follows that JQ∗p = E
TQ˜TDpQ˜E, where E is the (a− 1)× a-matrix given in block form as
E =
(
ida−1
(−1)1×(a−1)
)
. (C.21)
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Write p¯ for the a-dimensional vector (p1, · · · , pa). Then for any v ∈ Ra, one has vTQ˜TDpQ˜p¯ =
vTQ˜T(1b×1) = v
T(1a×1) =
∑a
i=1 vi. As such, with respect to the inner product B induced by the
matrix Q˜TDpQ˜ on Ra, one has B(p¯, p¯) = 1, and p¯ is perpendicular to the column vectors of E.
Let E˜ be the matrix written in block form as (p¯ E); then
E˜TQ˜TDp¯Q˜E˜ =
(
1 01×(a−1)
0(a−1)×1 JQ∗p
)
; (C.22)
as such det(E˜TQ˜TDp¯Q˜E˜) = det(JQ∗p). On the other hand, Lemma C.8 shows that | det(E˜)| = 1;
hence det(E˜TQ˜TDp¯Q˜E˜) = det(Q˜TDp¯Q˜). Together this proves this Lemma.
Lemma C.8. Let n ∈ Z≥0, let v ∈ R
n. Then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v1 1 0 · · · 0
v2 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
vn−1 0 0 · · · 1
vn −1 −1 · · · −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (−1)n+1
n∑
i=1
vi. (C.23)
Proof. By induction: for n = 1 this is immediate. Now suppose the statement is true for n − 1;
then∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v1 1 0 · · · 0
v2 0 1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
vn−1 0 0 · · · 1
vn −1 −1 · · · −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= v1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · 1
−1 −1 · · · −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
v2 1 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
vn−1 0 · · · 1
vn −1 · · · −1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(C.24)
= (−1)n+1v1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 · · · 0
...
. . .
...
0 · · · 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ + (−1)
n+1
n∑
i=2
vi = (−1)
n+1
n∑
i=1
vi.
Lemma C.9. Suppose Q is faithful. Then
(a−1)Uasµ (Q)+h(P ) =
a− 1
2
log(2πe)+h(M˜)−
1
2
EM
[
b∑
y=1
log(My) + log detKM
]
. (C.25)
Proof. Since Q is faithful, we have a = d. In this case, we find that the map ψ from (C.8)
is simply the map Q∗, and P = M˜ . Furthermore, it follows from Lemmas C.2 and C.5 that∑b
y=1 log(My) + log detKM = log
detKM
detCM
= − log det JM . Combining this with Lemma C.7, we
find
(a− 1)Uasµ (Q) + h(P ) =
a− 1
2
log(2πe) +
1
2
EM log det JM + h(P ) (C.26)
=
a− 1
2
log(2πe) + h(M˜)−
1
2
EM
[
b∑
y=1
log(My) + log detKM
]
.
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C.7 Proof of Theorem 6.7.2
It now remains to prove Theorem 6.7.2. We will need one linear-algebraic Lemma. Recall that by
assumption 1 in section C.3, we have that B = B>0.
Lemma C.10. For y ∈ B, let ey be the y-th unit vector in R
B. Let ∼ be as in Def. 6.3. Define the
vector spaces
U =
{∑
y∈B
cyey : ∀E ∈ B/∼,
∑
y∈E
cy = 0
}
(C.27)
and, for any x ∈ A,
Vx =
{∑
y∈B
cyey :
∀y, (Q˜y|x=0 ⇒ cy=0),∑
y cy=0
}
. (C.28)
Then U =
∑
x Vx.
Proof. Let
∑
y cyey ∈ Vx, and let F be the set of all y such that cy 6= 0. By definition of Vx, this
means that Q˜y|x > 0 for all y ∈ F ; hence F is contained in one equivalence class E0 in B under
∼. Since
∑
y cy = 0, one has
∑
y∈E0
cy = 0, and since all other coefficients are 0 the same holds
for all other orbits; hence Vx ⊂ U , from which
∑
x Vx ⊂ U follows. For the converse inclusion,
note that U is generated by elements of the form ey − ey′ with y ∼ y′. For such y and y′, there
exists a sequence y0, · · · , yk in B>0 and a sequence x1, · · · , xk in A such that y0 = y, yk = y′,
and Qyi−1|xi, Qyi|xi > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. For such a sequence one has eyi−1 − eyi ∈ Vxi ; hence
ey − ey′ =
∑
i eyi−1 − eyi ∈
∑
x Vx, which proves the converse inclusion.
Proof of Theorem 6.7.2. We write I(~Y ;T ) = I(S;T ) = H(S)−H(S|T ). By Lemmas C.4 and C.6
we know that H(S)
∞
−→ b+d
2
log(n) + C, for some constant C. Hence we only need to determine
the behaviour of H(S|T ). Fix a vector t ∈ ZA≥0 such that
∑
x tx = n, and assume that all tx are
positive; this assumption is harmless as for large n the probability that all tx are positive goes to
1. For each x ∈ A, let W x = n−1Sx, where Sx is drawn from a multinomial distribution of tx
samples, with probability vector Q˜•|x. Then S = n
∑
xW
x. The multivariate de Moivre – Laplace
theorem tells us that for large tx, the discrete random variable W x is approximately equal to the
n−1-discretisation of a multivariate normal distribution. Contrary to what we have done in this
appendix so far, it is here convenient to describe this as a singular normal distribution (see [44,
Section 2]) with mean mx := Q˜•|x, and a singular covariance matrix given by txn2C
x, where Cx is
the (b× b)-matrix Cxy,y′ = δy=y′Q˜y|x − Q˜y|xQ˜y′|x for y, y
′ ≤ b. Its support is the affine space given
by
Ax := m
x +
{∑
y
cyey :
∀y: (Q˜y|x=0 ⇒ cy=0),∑
y cy=0
}
⊂ Rb. (C.29)
Since W =
∑
xW
x, we can see W as approximating a discretisation of a multivariate normal
distribution with mean
∑
xm
x whose support is the affine space
∑
xAx. By Lemma C.10, the
dimension of this affine space is equal to that of the vector space U of (C.27), which is b − b′.
The covariance matrix of this multivariate distribution is n−2
∑
x txC
x, which has b − b′ positive
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eigenvalues. By the result of [44, Prop. 2.1.7] and the fact thatW is the discretisation of step size
n−1 of an (b− b′)-dimensional continuous random variable, we find that the entropy of H(S|T ) =
H(W |T ) for large n converges to8
Et[H(W |T = t)]
∞
−→ Et
[
(b− b′) log n+ 1
2
log det′
(∑
x
tx
n2
Cx
)
+ constant
]
, (C.30)
where det′ is the product of the positive eigenvalues of the matrix. For large n, the discrete ran-
dom variable n−1t converges to a discretisation of P , hence Et
[
log det′
(∑
x
tx
n2
Cx
)]
converges to
EP
[
log det′
(∑
x
Px
n
Cx
)]
. which is equal to (b′− b) log n+EP [log det
′ (
∑
x PxC
x)] as the matrix
has b − b′ positive eigenvalues. Applying this to (C.30), we see that H(W |T )
∞
−→ b−b
′
2
logn up to
a constant Combining this with what we know for H(S), we find
I(~Y ;T ) = H(S)−H(S|T )
∞
−→
b+ d− 2
2
log n−
b− b′
2
logn+const. =
b′ + d− 2
2
log n+const.
(C.31)
D Computational complexity & specific protocols
D.1 General computational complexity
In this subsection, we describe how computationally involved the various metrics are, without
making assumptions on the protocol or the privacy distribution. As a reminder, by 〈x, y〉 we mean
that to compute the metric, we need to calculate the sum of x different y-dimensional integrals,
where the integrand does not scale with n in complexity. We assume b ≥ a for simplicity.
Lemma D.1. The complexity of calculating Udistrn,µ (Q) and U
digit
n,µ (Q) is at most 〈O(n
b−1), a〉.
Proof. One has Udistrn,µ (Q) =
I(~Y ;P )
I( ~X;P )
and Udigitn,µ (Q) =
I(~Y ;P )−h(P )
a−1
, so the complexity of computing
these is equal to that of computing I(~Y ;P ) (or I( ~X;P ), which is the same). If we let S be as in
section 2.4, then I(~Y ;P ) = I(S;P ). Write rs(p) := P(S = s|P = p), then
I(S;P ) = H(S)− H(S|P ) =
∑
s
(
EP
[
rs(P ) log rs(P )
]
− EP [rs(P )] logEP [rs(P )]
)
(D.1)
where rs(p) =
∏
y
(∑
x Q˜y|xpx
)sy
. We see that for every s we need to perform two a-dimensional
integrals. Since the number of s is O(nb−1), this proves the lemma.
Lemma D.2. The complexity of calculating Utallyn,µ (Q) is at most 〈O(n
a−1), a〉+ 〈O(nab−1), 0〉.
8The term “constant” in (C.30) is generally not equal to the constant b−b
′
2
log(2pie) from [44], since they compute
the differential entropy from an orthonormal basis, while our basis consists of elements of the form ey − ey′ .
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Proof. Similar to the previous Lemma one has Utallyn,µ (Q) =
I(S;T )
H(T )
. Analogous to the previous
lemma one can show that the complexity of calculating H(T ) is at most O(na−1), so we focus
on the numerator again. To calculate this, it is sufficient calculate all probabilities of the form
P(S = s, T = t). LetM be the set
M =
{
M ∈ ZB×A≥0 :
∑
y
∑
x
My|x = n
}
. (D.2)
An element of M ‘stands for’ the situation that for every (y, x) there are precisely My|x users
which have Xi = x and Yi = y. Then
P(S = s, T = t) =
∑
M∈M:
∀y,
∑
xMy|x=sy,
∀x,
∑
y My|x=tx
(
n
~M
)
Ep
[∏
x
(
p
∑
yMy|x
x
∏
y
Q˜
My|x
y|x
)]
, (D.3)
= Ep
[∏
x
ptxx
] ∑
M∈M:
∀y,
∑
xMy|x=sy,
∀x,
∑
yMy|x=tx
(
n
~M
)∏
x,y
Q˜
My|x
y|x , (D.4)
where ~M is the matrix M considered as a ab-length vector, in order to plug it into a multinomial
coefficient. Since #M = O(nab−1), and there are O(na−1) possibilities for t, this means that
in total we can find Utallyn,µ (Q) by performing O(n
a−1) integrals in a dimensions and calculating
O(nab−1) products.
Lemma D.3. The complexity of calculating Sµ(Q) is at most 〈O(1), a〉.
Proof. Since this metric does not depend on n, we need only a constant (in terms of n) integrations,
over the a-dimensional space PA.
Lemma D.4. The complexity of calculating Uasµ is at most as complex as taking an a-dimensional
integral over the logarithm over a sum of (a− 1)!ba−1 terms.
Proof. Every coefficient of the matrix JQ∗p from Lemma C.7 is a sum of b terms. Since this is a
(a− 1)× (a− 1)-matrix, the determinant can be written as a sum of (a− 1)! terms, each of which
is a product of a − 1 coefficients of the matrix. Writing out each of these products gives us the
determinant as a sum of (a− 1)!ba−1 terms. To get Uasµ we need to integrate over the logarithm of
this.
Lemma D.5. For a given ~y, and assuming a Dirichlet prior, the posterior distribution is a ‘polyno-
mial’ with real exponents in the px with at most O(n
a−1) monomial terms. The coefficient of each
of these is a sum of at most O(n(a−1)(b−1)) terms.
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Proof. Let M be as in (D.2); define M′ = {M ∈ M : ∀y
∑
xMy|x = sy}, where s is the tally
vector of the given vector ~y. Then for a givenM′, there are exactly
∏
y
(
sy
My|•
)
vectors ~x such that∑
yMy|x = tx for all x. As such we can rewrite (9.4) as
fP |~Y=~y(p) =
1
C~y
∑
t

 ∑
M∈M′:
∀x,
∑
yMy|x=tx
(∏
y
(
sy
My|•
))(∏
x,y
Q˜
My|x
y|x
)B(α + t)∆α+t(p). (D.5)
Since every Dirichlet distribution contributes a monomial to the posterior distribution, and for
a given t there are O(n(a−1)(b−1)) elements of M′ whose columns sum to the tx, the Lemma
follows.
Remark D.6. As in section 9, if the prior distribution is a Dirichlet distribution, there are various
techniques to numerically evaluate the expected values in this appendix via Monte Carlo methods.
D.2 GRR
Proof of Proposition 10.1. Note that H(Yi|Xi, P = p) = H(Yi|Xi) = −
∑
x,y Q˜y|xpx log Q˜y|x.
Since Q˜y|x =
1+δy=xβ
a+β
, we can write this as
H(Yi|Xi) = −
∑
x
1 + β
a+ β
px log
1 + β
a+ β
−
∑
x 6=y
1
a+ β
px log
1
a+ β
= log(a+β)−
1 + β
a + β
log(1+β).
(D.6)
Now let us considerH(Yi|P = p). Since P(Yi = y|P = p) is equal to
∑
x Q˜y|xpx =
1+βpy
a+β
, we find
that
H(Yi|P ) = EP
[
−
∑
y
1 + βPy
a+ β
log
1 + βPy
a+ β
]
= log(a+ β)−
∑
y
EP
[
1 + βPy
a+ β
log(1 + βPy)
]
.
(D.7)
On the right hand side, since every Py has the same distribution, each summand is the same. It
follows that
Sµ(GRR
a,ε) = 1−
H(Yi|P )− H(Yi|Xi, P )
H(Xi|P )
(D.8)
= 1−
(1 + β) log(1 + β)− a · EP
[
1+βPy
a+β
log(1 + βPy)
]
(a+ β) H(Xi|P )
. (D.9)
Substituting β + 1 = eε now proves (10.4). With regards to the asymptotic utility, note that
since Q˜ is a square matrix, in Def. 6.5 we have
det(Q˜TDpQ˜) = (det Q˜)
2 · det(Dp). (D.10)
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Let c = 1a×1. Then Q˜ =
β
a+β
ida+
1
a+β
ccT, so the matrix determinant lemma [17] tells us that
det(Q˜) =
(
1 +
1
a+ β
cT
(
β
a+ β
ida
)−1
c
)
det
(
β
a+ β
ida
)
=
βa−1
(a+ β)a−1
. (D.11)
We also know det(Dp) = (a+β)a
∏
x(1+βpx)
−1. Hence det(Q˜†DpQ˜) =
β2a−2
(a+β)a−2
∏
x(1+βpx)
−1.
Plugging this into Def. 6.5 we find
Uasµ (GRR
a,ε) = −
1
2
log(2πe)+log β−
a− 2
2a− 2
log(a+β)−
1
2a − 2
∑
x
EPx log(1+βPx). (D.12)
Since the value of EPx log(1 + βPx) does not depend on the choice of x as the prior is symmetric,
this proves the Proposition.
From the formulas in Proposition 10.1 we immediately get the following complexity result:
Corollary D.7. The complexity of calculating Sµ(GRR
a,ε) is at most 〈O(1), 1〉, while to calculate
Uasµ (GRR
a,ε) one needs to perform only a 1-dimensional integral.
Lemma D.8. Let ~y ∈ An, and let p ∈ PA. Let β = e
ε − 1. Then
P(~Y = ~y|P = p) =
1
(β + a)n
∏
x∈A
(1 + βpx)
sx =
1
(β + a)n
∑
k∈ZA≥0:
∀x kx≤sx
β
∑
x kx
(∏
x
(
sx
kx
)
pkxx
)
.
(D.13)
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 10.1 one has P(Yi = y|P = p) =
∑
x Q˜y|xpx =
1+βpy
a+β
,
and the first equality in the Lemma is a direct consequence of this. Now note that (1 + βpx)sx =∑sx
kx=0
(
sx
kx
)
βkxpkxx ; this proves the second equality.
Proof of Proposition 10.2. Let α be the constant vector of length a with value 1
2
; then applying the
first equation of Lemma D.8 gives us
fP |~Y=~y(p) =
∆α(p)P(~Y = ~y|P = p)
P(~Y = ~y)
∝
∏
x∈A
(1 + βpx)
sxp
− 1
2
x . (D.14)
To find the right normalisation constant, we use the second equation of Lemma D.8 to see that the
right hand side of (D.14) is equal to
∑
k∈ZA≥0:
∀x kx≤sx
β
∑
x kx
(∏
x
(
sx
kx
)
p
kx−
1
2
x
)
=
∑
k∈ZA≥0:
∀x kx≤sx
B(k + 1
2
)β
∑
x kx∆k+ 1
2
(p). (D.15)
Since Dirichlet distributions integrate to 1, this gives us the correct normalisation constant.
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Corollary D.9. For a given ~y, and assuming the Jeffreys prior, the posterior distribution is a
‘polynomial’ in the px (with rational coefficients) with at most O(n
a) terms.
In the case that µ = µJef , we can also give formulas that allow us to calculate U
distr
n,µJef
(GRRa,ε),
at least for small a and n, because we can reduce to only onedimensional integration:
Proposition D.10. Write α = (1/2, · · · , 1/2) ∈ Ra. Fix n ∈ Z≥1, and consider the sets
Sn =
{
s ∈ Za≥0 :
a∑
y=1
wy = n
}
, for s ∈ Sn : K(s) =
{
k ∈ Za≥0; ∀y, ky ≤ sy
}
. (D.16)
For s ∈ Sn define
Fn(β, s) =
∑
k∈K(s)
β
∑
y ky
(a+ β)n
(
a∏
y=1
(
sy
ky
))
B(α+ k)
B(α)
; (D.17)
G(β) = a · EL
[(
1 + βL
a + β
)
log
(
1 + βL
a+ β
)]
, (D.18)
where L is drawn from a beta distribution with parameters
(
1
2
, a−1
2
)
. Then
I(~Y ; ~P ) = n ·G(β)−
∑
s∈Sn
(
n
s
)
Fn(β, s) log(Fn(β, s)), (D.19)
I( ~X;P ) = n · H(Xi|P )−
∑
s∈S
(
n
s
)
B(α + s)
B(α)
log
B(α + s)
B(α)
. (D.20)
Proof. Since the Yi are independent given P we have I(~Y ;P ) = H(~Y ) − H(~Y |P ) = H(~Y ) −
nH(Yi|P ). From (D.7) we see that H(Yi|P ) = −G(β) (note that L, like any Px, is from a beta
distribution with parameters (1
2
, a−1
2
)). Furthermore, for ~y ∈ Bn we have, from Lemma D.8 we
have
P(~Y = ~y) = EP

(β + a)−n
∑
k∈ZA≥0:
∀x kx≤sx
β
∑
x kx
(∏
x
(
sx
kx
)
P kxx
) = Fn(β, s). (D.21)
Since there are
(
n
s
)
vectors ~y ∈ Bn with tallies s, we getH(~Y ) = −
∑
s∈Sn
(
n
s
)
Fn(β, s) logFn(β, s).
This gives us the expression for I(~Y ;P ). Since T follows a Dirichlet-multinomial distribution, we
have P( ~X = ~x) = B(α+t)
B(α)
; the expression for I( ~X ;P ) follows from this.
Corollary D.11. The complexity of calculating Udistrn,µ (GRR
a,ε) and Udigitn,µ (GRR
a,ε) is at most
〈O(na(a−1)), 0〉+ 〈O(1), 1〉.
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D.3 UE
Proof of Proposition 10.3. Given Xi = x, we can consider Yi to be a vector of a different inde-
pendent Bernoulli variables. At position x, this Bernoulli variable has probability κ of returning 1,
and at all other positions the probability is λ. As such we find H(Yi|Xi) = (a− 1)Hb(λ)+Hb(κ).
Now let us consider H(Yi|P = p). Note that for a given y ∈ 2A and p ∈ PA one has
P(Yi = y|P = p) = λ
#y−1(1− λ)a−#y−1
(
λ(1− κ) + (κ− λ)
∑
x∈y
px
)
. (D.22)
Since
∑
x∈y Px follows a beta distribution with parameters (
#y
2
, a−#y
2
), it follows that
H(Yi|P ) = −
a∑
g=0
(
a
g
)
ERg [Rg logRg] . (D.23)
Since Sµ(UE
a,κ,λ) = 1− H(Yi|P )−H(Yi|Xi)
H(Xi|P )
, this proves the Proposition.
Corollary D.12. The complexity of calculating Sµ(UE
κ,λ) is at most 〈O(1), 1〉.
Proposition D.13. Let α = (1
2
, · · · , 1
2
) ∈ Ra, and define
Sn = {s ∈ Z
2A
≥0 :
∑
y
sy = n}, (D.24)
for s ∈ Sn : K(s) = {k ∈ Z
2A
≥0 : ∀y, ky ≤ sy}, (D.25)
for r ∈ Z≥0 : M
y(r) =
{
my ∈ Z2
A
≥0 : ∀x /∈ y,m
y
x = 0;
∑
x∈y
myx = r
}
. (D.26)
For s ∈ Sn, k ∈ K(s),my ∈M
y(ky) for all y, and 0 ≤ λ ≤ κ ≤ 1, define
G(s, k, (my)y, κ, λ) =
λ
∑
y(sy#y−ky)(κ− λ)
∑
y ky B
(
α +
∑
ym
y
)
(1− λ)−n(a−1)+
∑
y sy#y(1− κ)−n+
∑
y ky B(α)
, (D.27)
F (s, κ, λ) =
∑
k∈K(s)
∑
(my)
y∈2A
:
∀y:my∈My(ky)
∏
y
((
sy
ky
)(
ky
my
))
G(s, k, (my)y, κ, λ).(D.28)
Let Rs be as in Proposition 10.3. Then under UE
a,κ,λ, and with P following the Jeffreys prior, we
have
I(~Y ;P ) = n
a∑
s=0
(
a
s
)
ERs [Rs logRs]−
∑
s∈Sn
(
n
s
)
F (s, κ, λ) log (F (s, κ, λ)) . (D.29)
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Proof. From (D.23) one has H(~Y |P ) = −
∑a
g=0
(
a
g
)
ERg [Rg logRg]. Now let ~y ∈ (2
A)n, and set
sy := #{i : yi = y} for every y ∈ 2A. Then
P(~Y = ~y) = EP
[∏
y
(
λ#y−1(1− λ)a−#y−1
(
λ(1− κ) + (κ− λ)
∑
x∈y
Px
))sy]
=
λ−n+
∑
y sy#y
(1− λ)−n(a−1)+
∑
y sy#y
EP
[∏
y
(
λ(1− κ) + (κ− λ)
∑
x∈y
Px
)sy]
. (D.30)
If we focus on the expected value, we see that it is equal to
EP
[∏
y
(
λ(1− κ) + (κ− λ)
∑
x∈y
Px
)sy]
(D.31)
=
∑
k∈K(s)
λn−
∑
y ky(κ− λ)
∑
y ky
(1− κ)−n+
∑
y ky
(∏
y
(
sy
ky
))
EP

∏
y
(∑
x∈y
Px
)ky . (D.32)
Focusing again on the expected value, we have
EP

∏
y
(∑
x∈y
Px
)ky = ∑
(my)
y∈2A
:
∀y:my∈My(ky)
∏
y
(
ky
my
)
EP
[∏
x
P
∑
ym
y
x
x
]
=
∑
(my)
y∈2A
:
∀y:my∈My(ky)
∏
y
(
ky
my
)B(α+∑ymy)
B (α)
. (D.33)
Combining equations (D.30), (D.32) and (D.33) now gives us that P(~Y = ~y) = F (w, κ, λ), and
substituting this in I(~Y ;P ) = H(~Y )− H(~Y |P ) proves the Proposition.
Corollary D.14. The complexity of calculating both Udistrn,µ (UE
κ,λ) and Udigitn,µ (UE
κ,λ) is at most
〈O(n1+(a+1)2
a−1
), 0〉+ 〈O(1), 1〉.
Proof. Note that the complexity of calculating both of these is equal to the complexity of calcu-
lating I(~Y ;P ). One has #Sn = O(n2
a−1), for s ∈ Sn one has #K(s) = O(n2
a
), and for y ∈ 2A
and r ≥ 0 one has #My(r) = O(r#y−1) if #y > 0, and 0 (if r > 0) or 1 (if r = 0) other-
wise. Since there are
(
a
g
)
choices of y with #y = g, the number of choices, given k ∈ K(s), for
(my)y ∈
∏
yM
y(ky) is equal to O(n
∑a
g=1 (
a
g)(g−1)) = O(n1+(a−2)2
a−1
). Combining these, we see
that we haveO(n1+(a+1)2
a−1
) choices for the tuple (s, k, (my)y); this is the complexity of calculat-
ing H(~Y ). For calculating H(~Y |P ), we need to compute a+ 1 onedimensional integrals.
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